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Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech,
User-Generated Ads, and the Challenge of
Regulation
REBECCA TUSHNET†
INTRODUCTION
Today’s attention economy drives ads to become
quicksilver, moving ever faster. It is harder and harder to
attract audience eyeballs, especially to content that looks
like advertising, so advertisers will go to any extreme to
overcome audiences’ perceptual resistance. Conventional
false advertising law will attempt to follow ads wherever
they go, no matter how unusual the format. But where ads
don’t necessarily look like ads, a different kind of consumer
deception can be at issue: deception about the independence
of a source, where consumers might give a message a
different measure of credibility if they knew its actual
sponsorship. Non-ad-like ads arguably straddle the line
between commercial and noncommercial speech, which is
important because the First Amendment presently tolerates
much less regulation of the latter. Ads are subject to
relatively stringent regulation of their truth compared to
non-ads. If those two categories can no longer be
distinguished, advertising law will have to be substantially
rewritten. Despite changes in ad presentation, however,
regulation is not impossible. We have the tools to ensure
that new forms of advertising do not destroy advertising law
as we know it.
This Article examines the dynamics that drive
advertisers to push into new formats, and the law’s ability
to regulate them. Part I discusses the ever-expanding scope
of advertising and connects this phenomenon to First
† Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to participants at the
Buffalo Advertising Law Conference and the University of Pennsylvania
Constitutional Law Workshop, and to Mike Seidman and Mark Tushnet. Eric
Goldman’s vehement disagreement was incredibly helpful in clarifying my
thinking. Mara Gassmann provided excellent research assistance.
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Amendment debates over commercial speech. I argue that it
will remain possible, and constitutional, to identify
advertising and subject it to prohibitions on false and
misleading claims, even for ads in unconventional formats.
Part II then addresses the ways in which regulators
were caught off-guard by these developments. Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, which frees online
service providers and users from liability for content
generated by other users, poses some unanticipated barriers
to regulating advertising. We might ultimately want to
amend the law to apply conventional false advertising
principles to advertiser adoption of pure user-generated
promotional material. If not, we will have to live with the
arbitrage opportunity section 230 allows.
Despite section 230’s provisions, regulators retain
flexibility in many situations. Part III takes up the Federal
Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) recent revisions of its guides on
testimonials and endorsements. The guidelines apply to
bloggers and others who receive substantial benefits from
advertisers in return for their endorsements. It has been
argued that section 230 prevents the FTC from holding
advertisers liable for paid bloggers’ false and misleading
claims or failure to disclose a sponsorship relation. After
exploring the First Amendment challenges posed by such
situations, including questions that go to the heart of the
justification for regulating commercial speech, I contend
that neither section 230 nor sound policy require the FTC to
ignore these new forms of communicating with potential
purchasers.
I. CONTROLLING ADVERTISING AT THE MARGINS
A. Extreme Speech and Advertising Creep
The “market” for speech faces problems of access (or
supply) intimately tied to problems of attention (or
demand), especially as modern technology has made more
salient the fact that we are all producers as well as
consumers of information. Jerome Barron’s classic article on
access to the press identifies dynamics that encourage
speech to become ever more intrusive, as a method of
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catching audiences’ attention.1 But just because speech can
attract attention—and even provide new and useful
information—does not mean that it merits First
Amendment protection. In fact, Barron would not have
granted any constitutional protection to commercial speech.
Yet his preferred constitutional regime is directly contrary
to prevailing First Amendment law in recent decades which
protects truthful commercial speech against many
restraints. Despite their differences, both Barron and
modern commercial speech doctrine justify their conclusions
with claims about audience needs and rights: what the
audience wants, or doesn’t know that it wants but would if
it heard the right pitch. This Part briefly explores new
practices of attention-getting and their relation to
commercial speech theory.
Given the proliferation of options—from hundreds of
cable channels to billions of webpages—attracting some
fraction of the world’s attention can be a daunting task.2
Even speakers who have access to media that can
theoretically reach the world will often want to go further
and find actual listeners.3 Search engines have aggravated
the problem because many people are satisfied with the first
search result they find, leading to a winner-take-all effect.4
Predictably, some individuals will misbehave, often as an
attention-getting device. It is a person sitting in the crowd,
after all, whom we imagine falsely shouting “fire” in a
crowded theater, not the well-orchestrated performers who
already command our attention by default.
Audiences are hard to predict. We often don’t even know
ourselves what we’ll want.5 We like novelty and we like
1. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1647 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship By Proxy: The First Amendment,
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
11, 17 & n.13 (2006).
3. See generally RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION xi-xii, 233
(2006) (discussing attention as the limiting resource in the modern information
economy).
4. See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 40 & n.84.
5. See Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
1151, 1170, 1173-74 (2006) [hereinafter Coasean Marketing] (arguing that
whether particular audience members would want to receive particular
advertising messages is often unknowable before the fact, especially as many
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familiarity; we want the same thing, only different.6 Our
desires do not so much conflict as reinforce one another, and
this paradox is part of what makes audiences so
unpredictable.
One way to get attention is to turn up the volume,
either literally or metaphorically, with shock and surprise.
Barron addressed this tactic as used by radical protestors to
break down the smug safety of everyday life:
By the bizarre and unsettling nature of his technique the
demonstrator hopes to arrest and divert attention long enough
to compel the public to ponder his message. But attentiongetting devices so abound in the modern world that new ones
soon become tiresome. The dissenter must look for ever more
unsettling assaults on the mass mind if he is to have
continuing impact. Thus, as critics of protest are eager and in
a sense correct to say, the prayer-singing student
demonstration is the prelude to Watts. But the difficulty with
this criticism is that it wishes to throttle protest rather than to
recognize that protest has taken these forms because it has
had nowhere else to go.7
preferences may be latent, that is, unknown before exposure to some external
stimulus such as an ad); Eric Goldman, Data Mining and Attention
Consumption, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY
CONVERSATION 225, 232 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds.,
2005) (“In practice, [a calculation of the social welfare effects of marketing]
cannot be made on an ex ante basis because the recipients’ interests are
heterogeneous but undisclosed. No one—not the government, not the marketer,
perhaps not even recipients themselves—precisely knows the recipients’
substantive interests, tolerance of attention consumption or reaction to
receiving a communication. Indeed, a recipient’s utility may vary from day to
day.”).
6. This accounts for the continuing appeal of the sequel. See Marjorie
Garber, I’ll Be Back, 21 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (1999) (“There is a paradox
implicit in the very concept of the sequel. In experiential terms, a sequel is a
highly conservative genre that supplies the comfort of familiarity together with
the small frisson of difference.”) (reviewing PART TWO: REFLECTIONS ON THE
SEQUEL (Paul Budra & Betty Schellenberg eds., 1998), available at
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n16/marjorie-garber/ill-be-back. As Garber notes,
literary theorizing about sequels has been profoundly influenced by Terry
Castle’s claim that “sequels are always disappointing,” because audiences
simultaneously hope that the sequel will be different, and that it will be exactly
the same; those hopes cannot both be realized. TERRY CASTLE, MASQUERADE AND
CIVILIZATION 133 (1986).
7. Barron, supra note 1, at 1647.
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As with protest, so with pornography: theorists of many
stripes agree that, as society tolerates more sexual activity
and display, pornography has to become more extreme to
excite its consumers.8 If oral sex is no longer taboo,
pornography will show more anal sex. Pornography thrives
on flouting boundaries, so it will follow to the edge of those
boundaries no matter how widely they are drawn.9
This dynamic also occurs with sellers of goods and
services in general. As we are exposed to more and more, it
becomes harder to get our attention, so promoters are forced
to further extremes. Advertising clutter drives marketers to
put messages on fire hydrants and potholes,10 on eggs, in
urinals, on the bellies of pregnant women, and anywhere
else that might surprise us out of our willful disregard.11
But the very barrage of sales pitches prompts us to raise our
threshold for attention, until each ad is almost
meaningless.12 We work hard to avoid ads, often enlisting

8. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 200 (1989) (“Greater efforts of brutality have become necessary to
eroticize the taboo—each taboo being a hierarchy in disguise—since the frontier
of the taboo keeps vanishing as one crosses it. Put another way, more and more
violence has become necessary to keep the progressively desensitized consumer
aroused to the illusion that sex (and he) is daring and dangerous.”); RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 364 (1992) (stating that the more pornography
circulates, “the more the demand for pornography will shift (not entirely, of
course) toward aspects of sexual depiction that remain tabooed.”).
9. Cf. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 209, 247 (2001) (arguing that people regularly desire to transgress sexual
boundaries and experience sexuality as forbidden).
10. Bruce Schreiner & Emily Fredrix, Newest Fast Food Ad Space: Indiana
Fire Hydrants, SALON, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.salon.com/food/2010/01/06/us
_kfc_ ads_on_hydrants/.
11. See, e.g., Laura Petrecca, Product Placement—You Can’t Escape It, USA
TODAY, Oct. 10, 2006, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
advertising/2006-10-10-ad-nauseum-usat_x.htm; Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth
Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 144 (2006).
12. See, e.g., KEN SACHARIN, ATTENTION! HOW TO INTERRUPT, YELL, WHISPER,
TOUCH CONSUMERS 3 (2001) (“[T]he power of marketing . . . is eroding from
lack of attention.”); Gerald Zaltman & Robin Higie Coulter, Seeing the Voice of
the Consumer: Metaphor-Based Advertising Research, 35 J. ADVERTISING RES. 35,
36 (1995) (“[T]ime famine [makes it] increasingly difficult for advertisers to
capture consumers’ attention and information-processing time.”).
AND
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technology to aid us.13 Many ads are functionally invisible,
triggering no reaction at all in our brains because we’ve
prescreened them, never allowing them to impinge on our
thoughts.14
Barron suggested that greater access to mainstream
channels of communication would help solve the problem of
the rioting dissenter, but that doesn’t seem likely. As his
own reference to the plethora of modern “attention-getting
devices” indicated, there are many more speakers who want
our attention than we have attention, not to mention desire
to listen. The scarcity is not in our stars—or star
reporters—but in ourselves.15 Barron’s escalation argument,
taken seriously, is deeply unsettling. There doesn’t seem to
be a way backwards, other than to abandon modern society
and technology. Perhaps we will all develop nearimpenetrable filters, armor-plating our attention.16 But
those filters are likely to screen out plenty of useful
information as well, thus avoiding the tragedy of the mental
commons only by preventing many productive encounters.
Because people react unpredictably and often creatively to
13. Fred von Lohmann, It’s My Browser, and I’ll Auto-Click if I Want To,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2009/10/its-my-browser-and-ill-auto-click-if-i-want.
14. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 547 (2008) (“[N]ew neuroscience studies
provide evidence for advertisers’ long-held belief that much advertising is
completely useless. In MRI studies, ‘a third to a half of commercials do not
generate any brain reaction at all.’”) (footnote omitted).
15. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom of Expression for The Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2004)
(“The digital revolution made a different kind of scarcity salient. It is not the
scarcity of bandwidth but the scarcity of audiences, and, in particular, scarcity
of audience attention. . . . [A]s the costs of distribution of speech are lowered,
and more and more people can reach each other easily and cheaply, the
competition for audience attention has grown ever more fervent.”) (footnote
omitted).
16. Cf. Goldman, Coasean Marketing, supra note 5, at 1202-09 (discussing
the possibility of personalized technology that allows through only ads of
interest to the recipient). Goldman’s proposal is intriguing, but it has problems
(as most accounts of choices to seek out or receive information do) with
preference formation, as discussed infra Section III.B.3. When people don’t
know what they will want, they are likely to make blanket choices such as
screening out all ads, to the great dismay of advertisers. See Noam Cohen,
Whiting Out the Ads, but at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at C3.
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their cultural environments, assembling bits and pieces of
information from various sources,17 it is hard to predict
what a world of successful attention self-defense would look
like, or even how to value it.
What I want to focus on is not Barron’s proposal to
allow dissenters greater access to the means of publication
and even a right of reply to mainstream speakers18—
arguably, the Internet has accomplished much of what he
could hope for on that front—but what Barron left out.
Crucially, Barron omitted advertising from his class of
constitutionally relevant speech. Coke would have no right
to reply to a Pepsi ad specifically targeting it, nor to an
editorial condemning soda’s role in promoting obesity.
Writing as he was before the Supreme Court granted more
than minimal protection to commercial speech, Barron
analogized from ads to mass media in a way now far outside
the mainstream of constitutional argument: because the
mass media is profit-oriented and largely contentindifferent, even its editorial aspects should be treated as
commercial speech and subjected to extensive government
regulation, at least about topic choice.19
Barron’s treatment of commercial speech is of particular
interest because his theory is based on listeners’ interests in
hearing all that is worthy of being said, and that is also the
core justification for modern commercial speech doctrine.20
17. See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1189 (2007).
18. See Barron, supra note 1, at 1660.
19. See id. at 1660-63; see also id. at 1668 (“Indeed, it has long been held that
commercial advertising is not the type of speech protected by the first
amendment, and hence even an abandonment of the romantic view of the first
amendment and adoption of a purposive approach would not entitle an
individual to require publication of commercial material.”) (footnote omitted).
20. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such speech
provides.”) (citation omitted); see also Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can
Commercial Corporations Engage In Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV.
379 (2006) (arguing in favor of the original audience-based rationale for
commercial speech doctrine); Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and
Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1989)
(promoting a “hearer-centered” concept of the First Amendment); Robert Post,
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 14-15
(2000) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Status] (“[The Court has] focused its
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In Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court appealed to
consumer-citizens’
interests
in
receiving
relevant
information to justify striking down a state rule that barred
price advertising for prescription drugs.21 Even if the
pharmacies had no right to speak, consumers had the right
to hear what they had to say. In this view, commercial and
corporate speakers may provide information and
perspectives that the audience would not otherwise
receive.22 At the same time, because the right to speak is
dependent on the audience’s interest (both in the sense of
desire and in the sense of entitlement) in receiving useful
information, this theory does not protect commercial speech
as strongly as political speech. For example, commercial
speakers can be forced to disclose relevant information to
avoid consumer deception, a topic to which I will return in
Part II.23
[commercial speech] analysis on the need to receive information, rather than on
the rights of speakers.”); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom
of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 353-60 (1991) (arguing that the concept of
listener autonomy explains much First Amendment law); cf. Robert Post,
Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced
Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L.
REV. 555 passim (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court’s recent shift towards
more speaker-focused justifications for protecting commercial speech, and the
doctrinal problems created thereby).
21. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763-64 (1976); see also, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
496 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he same interest that supports regulation of
potentially misleading advertising, namely, the public’s interest in receiving
accurate commercial information, also supports an interpretation of the First
Amendment that provides constitutional protection for the dissemination of
accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (explaining that
commercial speech receives constitutional protection because of its
informational function).
22. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1405, 1411 (1986).
23. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“Because the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value
to consumers of the information such speech provides, [an advertiser’s]
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal.”) (citation omitted). As product
placement and other forms of stealth advertising become more common, the line
between commercial speech and mass media productions in general becomes
more blurred, in ways that support Barron’s contention that mass media are
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Audience-focused
theories
can
produce
such
diametrically opposed results—nonexistent or robust
protection for advertising—because the audience’s interests
can be defined in multiple ways. The audience doesn’t
necessarily know what it wants. Worse, it might want
different things depending on what it hears. The same
might theoretically be true of speakers, but First
Amendment theorists have generally been satisfied with
assuming that speakers know, when they start to talk, what
they want to say. Thus, speakers’ interests can simply be
defined as interests in communicating their selected
messages. At most, speakers may be understood to have an
additional interest in being heard, as Barron emphasized,
but it has always seemed obvious that speakers know what
they want to say.
By contrast, the question of what audiences want, or
deserve, to see and hear offers much more room for debate.
In a reversal of Barron’s critique, Cass Sunstein has drawn
on the audience-interest tradition to argue for forced
exposure to competing views. In a world where mass media
are not especially powerful, he contends, audiences should
be exposed to multiple competing viewpoints, so that they
do not get lost in an echo chamber that only reinforces their
preexisting prejudices.24 Regardless of the merits of
Sunstein’s proposal, participants in modern information
environments can’t possibly consume all the information
available to them, or even a tiny subset of it. Access alone
will never be enough. Speakers will always have incentives
to seek more attention than audiences want to give them.

essentially profit-seeking and indifferent to content and therefore can be
regulated in the service of democratic self-government. See Goodman, supra
note 11, at 89-96, 152 (arguing for mandatory disclosure of commercial
sponsorship in nontraditional promotional contexts such as product placement,
news story placement, and “astroturf” grass-roots word-of-mouth marketing
campaigns). Evoking the same audience-focused justifications as Barron did,
Goodman writes that “[m]andated source disclosure is the kind of government
intervention in speech markets that the public rights theory of the First
Amendment supports.” Id. at 131.
24. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 110-20 (2007). Others criticize
Sunstein’s argument on various grounds and point out that audience members
may seek out different perspectives on their own initiative. E.g., YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 238-39 (2006).
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Given an audience-focused justification for commercial
speech doctrine, audiences’ dogged attempts to evade or
ignore advertising suggest that even if audiences have
rights to receive desired information that the state would
prefer to suppress, such rights can’t support an advertiser’s
claim of a right to provide information in which consumers
have expressed no interest.25 An audience-focused theory
might then propose limits on speech designed simply to
attract attention the audience doesn’t want to give but
(perhaps for cognitive/perceptual reasons) can’t avoid. These
limits would be analogous to conventional volume
restrictions—the classic ban on loudspeaker trucks in
residential neighborhoods.26 The theory would be that
attempts to change the audience’s preferences through
ambush or camouflage are illegitimate even if they are
ultimately successful in selling products.27 This underlies
proposals to help audiences identify advertiser-sponsored
speech and, if they choose, avoid or discount it.
Such proposals react to a classic problem of imperfect
information. In practice, we manage our attention grossly,
unable or unwilling to discriminate on content before we’ve
already been exposed to a particular advertising message.
We are vulnerable to attempts to evade our existing rules of
thumb for avoiding ads. As a result, advertisers are
attracted to methods that don’t let audiences know an ad is
coming, such as sponsored product placement in traditional
forms of entertainment and surprising ad formats or
content.
Just as our filters can be defeated by new forms of
advertising, so too can First Amendment doctrine.
Commercial speech regulation requires reshaping in the
new world where new forms of ads compete for our
25. See Bennigson, supra note 20, at 422-23.
26. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding prohibitions against
loudspeakers in residential areas).
27. Cf. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965)
(“In each [case of prohibited false advertising or trademark infringement] the
seller has used a misrepresentation to break down what he regards to be an
annoying or irrational habit of the buying public . . . . In each case the seller
reasons that when the habit is broken the buyer will be satisfied with the
performance of the product he receives. Yet, a misrepresentation has been used
to break the habit and . . . a misrepresentation for such an end is not
permitted.”).
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attention, focusing not just on the truth or falsity of
advertising claims but also on whether consumers are
aware of their exposure to advertising. Recently, legal
scholarship has begun to address topics such as product
placement in entertainment, proposing various ways to deal
with advertising claims communicated through movies,
television shows, and other forms traditionally understood
as noncommercial speech, but there is little actual law on
the subject.28 The next section considers existing doctrine on
nontraditional advertising formats, which suggests that
new formats will not defeat regulation.
B. Regulating Unusual Advertising Formats as They
Become Usual
In broad strokes, devoting regulatory attention to new
types of ads should not be hugely difficult under commercial
speech doctrine. So far, courts have found commercial
speech doctrine applicable to new ad formats, where the
alternative would be to allow false and misleading
commercial claims to be virtually immune from regulation.
The Supreme Court’s last, failed attempt to engage the
definition of commercial speech showed how new types of
ads will either make commercial speech doctrine bend or
break. In Nike v. Kasky,29 Nike responded to a concerted
campaign against its labor practices with a variety of
statements, some made to reporters, others published as
“advertorials,” and still others included in letters to colleges
attempting to dissuade them from severing sponsorship ties
with Nike.30 Nike argued that its speech was political
speech, in part because it did not appear in conventional
advertising formats. The unusual format didn’t change the
outcome: the California Supreme Court’s finding that Nike’s
28. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 11; William Benjamin Lackey, Can Lois
Lane Smoke Marlboros?: An Examination of the Constitutionality of Regulating
Product Placement in Movies, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 275 (1993); Matthew
Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine: The Business, Legal,
and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 331
(2004); Raghu Seshadri, Note, “Did You Want Fries with That?” The
Unanswered Question of Federal Product Placement Regulation, 9 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 467 (2006).
29. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam).
30. Id. at 656 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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statements constituted commercial speech was the final
word in the case.31 The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed
certiorari as improvidently granted, perhaps because any
decision in favor of Nike would have shaken the foundations
of advertising law.32
Justice Breyer, dissenting from the Court’s decision to
dismiss, concluded that the materials at issue in Nike were
not commercial speech.33 He noted that they appeared
outside of a traditional advertising format, focusing on a
letter sent to numerous college presidents.34 The letter was,
as he pointed out, different from a newspaper or television
ad.35 But that was because the letter was directed to a much
smaller audience than a newspaper or television show:
people who controlled college athletic budgets. It sought the
attention of exactly the people in a position to make
significant purchasing decisions. False advertising law has
had no difficulty finding similar letters to be commercial
speech when they targeted small, specialized markets, and
this makes perfect sense.36 Indeed, press releases have

31. Id. at 654.
32. See Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle: The First Amendment, Fairness,
and Corporate Reputation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1457, 1465 (2009).
33. Nike, 539 U.S. at 676 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 676-77.
35. Id. at 677.
36. See, e.g., Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d
725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that where the relevant market consists of only
a limited number of potential purchasers, a promotional presentation to a single
customer may qualify as false advertising); Champion Labs. v. Parker-Hannifin
Corp., 616 F. Supp. 2d 684 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (holding that a presentation to a
single large client could be commercial advertising and promotion); Mobius
Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 1005, 1019-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a letter to a single customer may be commercial
advertising); cf. Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1137-38
(D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a nonprofit organization’s unlicensed use of
trademark in fund-raising letters constituted false advertising). But see UltraTemp Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Sys., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 86, 92-93 (D. Mass.
1998) (holding that a letter to a single customer is not advertising); Garland Co.
v. Ecology Roof Sys. Corp., 895 F. Supp. 274, 279 (D. Kan. 1995) (same);
Goldsmith v. Polygram Diversified Ventures, Inc., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Am. Needle & Novelty Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg.,
Inc., 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1062-63 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same).
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latterly become common targets in false advertising cases,37
and have also played important roles in securities fraud
cases.38 Similarly, direct mail, distribution of article
reprints,39 business cards,40 seminars,41 statements to trade
37. See, e.g., Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 201 F.3d 1058 (8th Cir. 2000);
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); Star-Brite
Distrib., Inc. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., No. 09-60812-CIV., 2010 WL 750353 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 4, 2010); Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Body Dynamics, Inc., No. 08-12711,
2009 WL 877640 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2009); Lawman Armor Corp. v. Master
Lock Co., No. Civ. A. 02-6605, 2004 WL 362210 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004); Enzo
Life Scis., Inc. v. Digene Corp., 295 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D. Del. 2003); Fedders
Corp. v. Elite Classics, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (S.D. Ill. 2003); Carell v. Shubert
Org., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); First Health Group Corp. v.
United Payors, No. 96 C 2518, 2000 WL 549723 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2000); Ferrer v.
Maychick, 69 F. Supp. 2d 495, 496 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Summit Tech., Inc. v.
High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
Interactive Network, Inc. v. NTN Commc’ns, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1398, 1410 (N.D.
Cal. 1995); In re Century 21-RE/MAX Real Estate Adver. Claims Litig., 882 F.
Supp. 915, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1)-(2) (2009)
(treating press releases regarding FDA-approved drugs and devices as
promotional labeling); Nancy L. Buc, FDA Regulation of Food, Drug, Cosmetic,
and Device Promotion, in ADVERTISING LAW IN THE NEW MEDIA AGE 361, 366-67
(1999) (discussing FDA assertions of authority over press releases and
fundraising letters featuring products in development). But see Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 634 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that
statements about litigation in press releases were not closely enough connected
to the sale of goods to constitute advertising or promotion within the meaning of
the Lanham Act); Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics,
859 F. Supp. 1521, 1532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that published surveys
claiming that publisher’s scientific journals were more heavily cited than other
publishers’ and press release about surveys did not constitute “commercial
advertising or promotion” and underlying surveys were fully protected by the
First Amendment). As Procter & Gamble and Gordon & Breach indicate, it is
the substance of the claim and not the presence of the claim in a communication
designated a “press release” that controls courts’ resolution of false advertising
issues.
38. See, e.g., Marsh Group v. Prime Retail, Inc., 46 F. App’x 140, 142-43, 145
(4th Cir. 2002); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 342,
347-48 (5th Cir. 2002); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 418, 424-25
(5th Cir. 2001); Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2000);
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2000); Stevelman v.
Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1999); In re PLC Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 41 F. Supp. 2d 106, 108 (D. Mass. 1999); In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179
F.R.D. 25, 32-33, 36-37 (D. Mass. 1997).
39. See Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 113 (6th Cir. 1995)
(reversing grant of summary judgment where article reprints containing false
claims were distributed at trade shows); Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A.,
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publications,42 and individual presentations by salespeople43
have been regulated under false advertising law. The FDA
regulates everything it calls “labeling,” which includes
calendars, films, and the Physicians’ Desk Reference,44 and
also regulates what researchers involved in clinical trials of
859 F. Supp. at 1532-45 (finding that dissemination of reprints of comparative
survey constituted commercial speech); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Informal
Staff Advisory Op. 97-5 (July 31, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/advops/
advis97-5.htm (stating that reprints of media articles about franchisor’s
earnings are likely to be subject to FTC’s franchise disclosure rules if franchisor
gives them to potential franchisee); “By disseminating copies of the news article
. . . the franchisor effectively ratifies the journalist’s words as its own and, in so
doing, converts the article into an advertising piece . . . .”. Id. But see Nat’l Life
Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ’g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 644-45 & n.33 (D. Md. 1992)
(finding advertisements accurately reporting portions of a newsletter were not
commercial speech because they were not included to aid in sale of product, but
rather as a comment on public controversy).
40. See Avon Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 768, 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that manufacturer’s dissemination of such things as
business cards constituted advertising or promotion under the Lanham Act).
41. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sage Seminars, Inc., No. C 95-2854 SBA, 1995
WL 798938, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1995) (finding representations made at
seminars given throughout U.S. were “in or affecting commerce” for purposes of
FTC Act).
42. See Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One, 985 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (M.D. Fla.
1997) (finding that statement to trade publication, directed toward contested
consumers, constituted advertising or promotion); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
675 N.E.2d 584, 594-95 (Ill. 1996) (finding a car manufacturer’s statement to
Car & Driver magazine that manufacturer knew would appear as part of an
automotive review could constitute consumer fraud under Illinois law); see also
Semco, 52 F.3d at 113 (finding a trade journal article written by the defendant’s
president primarily to tout the defendant’s goods was commercial speech).
43. See Avon Prods., 984 F. Supp. at 776-78, 795 (addressing product claims
made by individual Avon sales representatives); Gordon & Breach Sci.
Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 905 F. Supp. 169, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding that presentations addressed to relevant consumers were
“advertising”); Nat’l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1235
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying a motion to dismiss a false advertising claim because
telephone conversations with friends and colleagues can constitute advertising
in particular industries).
44. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(2) (2009) (“Brochures, booklets, mailing pieces,
detailing pieces, file cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogs, house
organs, letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound
recordings, exhibits, literature . . . and references published (for example, the
‘Physicians Desk Reference’) for use by medical practitioners . . . are hereby
determined to be labeling.”).
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unapproved drugs can say to doctors and reporters.45 Drug
companies sponsor studies that they hope to have published
in peer-reviewed journals, then use those studies for their
own marketing purposes, drawing regulatory responses.46
In other words, accepting Justice Breyer’s objection
would have thrown into question a broad range of existing
advertising regulation and case law. Justice Breyer offered
no reason to have a small-market or press release exception
to the law.47 Nor was Justice Breyer’s general attention to
format appropriate, especially in a world in which
advertising can take any form we can conceive and probably
some we can’t.48 The press releases that formed part of the
challenged materials in Nike are increasingly standard
means of communicating directly with consumers, as
companies know that material in their press releases will
often be passed on without alteration by reporters49 or read
45. See Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Aims at Doctors’ Drug Pitches, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2010, at B1.
46. For an example of study manipulation that ultimately resulted in a false
advertising lawsuit, see Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627
F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.N.J. 2009). While a study that was supposed to prove a
product’s superiority was ongoing, the product’s advertiser took “secret and
forbidden peeks at the data looking for trends, and even changed the study
endpoints and stopped the study early in response.” Id. at 409. When a New
England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”) reviewer asked if there had been an
interim analysis, the advertiser and the individual authors denied it, then
amended the article to include their false denial. Id. The court was not
impressed by the fact that the advertiser’s marketing director “provided input to
the NEJM article to try to make it misleading, and then celebrated the final
version’s obscuring of the limitation of the results of the study . . . and its overly
broad and unsupportable conclusion.” Id.
47. One might argue that targeted messages pose less of a risk of polluting
the information commons. It’s not amount of information but quality, however,
with which false advertising law is concerned. Cf. Post, Constitutional Status,
supra note 20, at 47-49 (arguing that private commercial speech should be more
subject to regulation because it does not participate in public reason).
48. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 640-41, 643-44 (1990); Lynette Holloway, Hip-Hop
Sales Pop: Pass the Courvoisier and Count the Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/02/business/media-hip-hop-sales-pop-pass-thecourvoisier-and-count-the-cash.html?pagewanted=1 (reporting on the economic
relationship between some rappers’ music and videos and commercial products
featured therein).
49. See “Picking Up” a Press Release Takes on New Meaning, PR NEWS, Aug.
26, 2002; Ned Steele, Interactive Press Releases on Web Change PR, Media
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directly by consumers.50 Nike’s letter nominally to a
newspaper editor included statements directed at readers in
their capacity as purchasers, including “[d]uring the
shopping season, we encourage shoppers to remember that
Nike is the industry’s leader in improving factory
conditions.”51 There is also a persuasive advantage to using
non-ad formats: though ads are regularly screened by
conventional publishers and broadcasters to ensure that
they meet minimal standards, press releases and other
promotional materials that are passed through untouched
are perceived by consumers as having survived a vetting
process, and thus as being credible.52 It is therefore neither
Landscape, O’Dwyer’s PR Services Report, Feb. 2001, at 39 (“It’s a commonly
known ‘dirty little secret’ of journalism and PR that press releases too often get
lifted whole, sometimes under a reporter’s byline, and published with scant, if
any, editing or fact-checking.”); cf. Brooks Barnes, Ad Budget Tight? Call the
P.R. Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2009, at BU7 (discussing the use of press
releases and other public relations activity to market movies). “Paramount
Pictures did not buy a single billboard to promote ‘Paranormal Activity,’ its
recent horror film. The studio also saved tens of millions of dollars by forgoing a
national television campaign. Instead, Paramount depended on its publicity arm
to fan interest on blogs and in traditional media. The flack attack worked: the
film, made for just $10,000, has sold $104 million in tickets.” Id. I am indebted
to Seth Oltman for his research on the use of press releases to communicate
directly with consumers.
50. See Steele, supra note 49, at 39. Yahoo!, for example, now mixes in press
releases with other news for general readers. And Sears’ press release titled
“Don’t Miss Deals on Holiday Gifts for the Entire Family” is plainly addressed to
customers, not reporters. See Press Release, Sears, Don't Miss Deals on Holiday
Gifts
for
the
Entire
Family
(Dec.
11,
2003),
available
at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=116376&TICK=
SEARS&STORY=/www/story/12-11-2003/0002074155&EDATE=Dec+11,+2003.
A similar press release, “Practical Meets Romance: Think Outside of the Candy
Box This Valentine’s Day,” uses phrases such as “You’ll feel the love,” “Wow
your significant other, your mom or your daughter,” and “Put a little power in
your man’s hand.” Press Release, Sears, Practical Meets Romance: Think
Outside of the Candy Box This Valentine’s Day (Feb. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=116376&TICK=
SEARS&STORY=/www/story/02-06-2004/0002104638&EDATE=Feb+6,+2004.
51. Kasky v. Nike, 45 P.3d 243, 258 (Cal. 2002).
52. See Barnes, supra note 49 (“‘At least with publicity—placed stories—
there is a feeling that the message has gone through a filter,’ said Paul Pflug,
the co-owner of Principal Communications, a public relations firm that
specializes in entertainment. ‘Journalists and their editors had to consider the
pitch worthy of space. The message has been vetted in some way.’ He said an
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unsurprising nor unfair that false advertising law as it
stands applies commercial speech rules to multiple
advertising formats.
The rise of product placement is likely to lead to further
disputes about what communications to the public can
legitimately be regulated by consumer protection law. To
date, courts have correctly rejected several trademark
infringement lawsuits by manufacturers who didn’t pay for
placement in a movie. The manufacturers alleged that
consumers would be confused and their brand images
harmed by negative portrayals in the movies.53 But when a
product is lauded because the advertiser paid for the
encomium and consumers are deceived about some
characteristic of that product, courts will either have to
subject entertainment media to advertising law under the
aegis of the Lanham Act and state consumer protection law,
or open up a fairly substantial loophole in advertising
regulation.54 As the developing case law on press releases
indicates, it is both likely and desirable that the First
Amendment will not pose a generalized barrier to pursuing
false advertising wherever it goes.
article was more valuable to the studios because it is more credible to viewers
than an ad.”).
53. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919-20, 923
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting trademark infringement claim where there were no
competing or inauthentic trademarks at issue); WHAM-O, Inc. v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting
trademark infringement claim because the plaintiff did not demonstrate likely
audience confusion). But see Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35
F. Supp. 2d 727, 730-32, 735 (D. Minn. 1998) (enjoining film company from
using Dairy Queen name because of potential customer confusion).
54. Deception about whether Coke paid for placement is another question,
addressed further below. There is no sound justification for the claim that, when
Coke didn’t pay for placement but consumers think that it permitted the
presence of its products in a movie, book, etc., Coke is harmed. See Mark A.
Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 434-36
(2010). Trademark owners would nonetheless like courts to believe that
unauthorized portrayals of their marks cause actionable harm. This article’s
main focus is on undisclosed-but-extant economic connections, essentially the
flipside of unauthorized uses. One side benefit of a robust disclosure rule,
however, would be to make trademark owners’ claims against expressive
unauthorized uses even less persuasive by making it even more unreasonable
for consumers to assume that mere mention or portrayal of a trademark,
without explicit sponsorship information, indicates any relationship between the
speaker and the trademark owner. See generally id.
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II. THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS (AND IN THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT): VOLUNTEERS AND THE
CHALLENGE THEY POSE TO ADVERTISING REGULATION
Product placement, letters to the editor, and press
releases involve nontraditional uses of mass media to
disseminate promotional messages. But there are many
other emerging marketing tactics. Volunteers from the
audience can also serve as shills. This has happened
accidentally—fans create works that advertisers then adopt,
as with the immensely popular short films showing two men
creating elaborate fountains powered by the chemical
interactions caused by Mentos dropped into bottles of Diet
Coke. These films were first disavowed, then embraced, by
the manufacturers of the candy and soda.55
Volunteer salespeople have also emerged by design,
with traditional marketers soliciting user-generated ads for
their products and showcasing the most persuasive ones in
various ways. Ellen Goodman explains how this unsettles
traditional false advertising law:
The regulation of false advertising . . . was designed to manage
information flows in relatively controlled environments where
few speakers were capable of mass communication. . . . [F]alse
advertising law assumes a model in which authorship is
singular or several, not massively composite. In the
environment of peer production, by contrast, all are capable of
mass communication and authorship is frequently cumulative
as users remix and mash up information provided by others.56

Uncertainty about whether an advertiser or an
unaffiliated individual is speaking is particularly
problematic on a doctrinal level because individual speakers
can generally make false claims about products, as long as
they are not defamatory and do not otherwise present a
clear and present danger of harm. Traditional advertisers
are governed by quite different rules holding them strictly
liable for falsehoods and requiring them to possess
substantiation for any material claims.57
55. See Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotions and False Advertising Law, 58
S.C. L. REV. 683, 684 (2007) (“[T]he power to disseminate brand-related
messages is now widely distributed.”).
56. Id. at 685 (citation omitted).
57. Tushnet, supra note 32, at 1465-66, 1470.
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Individuals have always been able to say things about
unrelated companies, but the growing regulatory problem is
one posed by the increasing visibility and potential reach of
such speech. Riffing off popular cultural artifacts is a classic
way to get attention. Before cheap streaming Internet video,
it was difficult to get one’s fifteen minutes of fame by
creating an ad; now, as the Mentos/Diet Coke films reveal,
it is a reasonable path to acclaim. New media structures
thus encourage and allow for wide distribution of a variety
of user-created promotional messages, though only a few
become hits.
As a result, volunteers may now be able to disseminate
misleading claims about products to millions, subject to
minimal or no regulation. In order to mitigate some of the
harm, we might conclude that advertisers should not be
allowed to boost the volunteer signal unless the message
follows the rules to which advertisers themselves are
subject. Ellen Goodman thus argues that advertisers should
be subject to ordinary advertising regulation when they
adopt user-generated promotional material as their own.58
I am sympathetic to this argument, but it would likely
require a change in the law. Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, designed to protect Internet
service providers against massive potential liability for
users’
defamatory
speech,
apparently
immunizes
advertisers against false advertising claims when they
adopt and promote user-generated ads online. Section 230
reads in relevant part, “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”59
Section 230 has mainly been used in non-advertising
cases, and it is still unclear how it will affect user-generated
58. See Goodman, supra note 55, at 703 (“Once a brand owner adopts the peer
promotion as its own, featuring the promotion on its web site or distributing it
by other means, this speech should be considered the brand owner’s
advertisement. That the sponsor has chosen to use an amateur instead of an
agency to produce its advertisements should not change the analysis. Moreover,
under the Lanham Act case law, it should not make a difference whether the
brand owner initially solicited the ads or simply adopted them later. In either
case, the brand owner is sponsoring speech for promotional purposes.”) (footnote
omitted).
59. 47 U.S.C § 230(c)(1) (2006).
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advertising. In one case, Quiznos ran a contest for
homemade ads, and the rules required “‘a comparison
between Quiznos and Subway with Quiznos being
superior.’”60 Quiznos posted its favorite ads online. Subway
sued, and Quiznos argued that it was just facilitating
consumer-generated ads, which was protected by section
230. The court first treated section 230 as an affirmative
defense, ruling that Quiznos’ claim couldn’t be decided on a
motion to dismiss,61 then denied summary judgment on the
ground that it was still uncertain whether Quiznos was
“actively responsible for the creation and development of
disparaging representations about Subway contained in the
contestant videos.”62 However, immunity from posting usergenerated ads on a website or YouTube channel should
follow as a matter of statutory interpretation if the
advertisers are not the source of false claims but only
disseminated claims made by another.63
It’s true that Congress didn’t contemplate advertiser
selection of others’ content for commercial benefit. The
model was AOL the web host, not AOL the advertiser
holding a contest for the best user-generated ad for AOL
services. Nonetheless, the user appears to be a separate
information provider, triggering section 230 in both cases,
because the language of the law distinguishes based on the
identity of the information provider, not on the motive for
its dissemination.
Another attempt to regulate advertiser adoption of
others’ speech comes from a recent opinion of the South
Carolina Ethics Bar. State bars have been struggling to deal
with lawyers’ Internet advertising, which can reach
potential clients in new ways. Anything on the Internet, not
just a banner ad, might in theory count as advertising. And
new intermediaries have sprung up to help potential clients
60. Louise Story, Can a Sandwich Be Slandered?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008,
at C1.
61. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1710, 2007 WL
1186026, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2007).
62. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, No. 3:06-cv-1710, 2010 WL
669870, at *23 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2010).
63. If the advertiser only selects the best ads, it should be entitled to section
230 immunity. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118-19 (9th
Cir. 2007) (finding section 230 immunity from secondary liability for ISPs for
state-law false advertising claims).
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find lawyers, including lawyer rating services that offer
profiles of lawyers. Sometimes for a fee, lawyers can “claim”
their profiles and add extra information to make themselves
more attractive. The South Carolina ethics body ruled that,
when a lawyer claims a profile on such a service, she
becomes responsible for its entire content.64 But section 230
by its terms prevents states from such attributions unless
the user herself—here, the lawyer—provides the content at
issue. The ethics body specifically stated that it was relying
on the opposite rule, holding the lawyer responsible for
statements of others,65 including peer endorsements, the
service’s ratings, and client comments.66 Unless the provider
64. See
South
Carolina
Bar,
Ethics
Advisory
Op.
09-10,
http://www.scbar.org/member_resources/ethics_advisory_opinions/&id=678
(analogizing the situation to one in which a client had, without the lawyer’s
knowledge, created an ad for the lawyer; once the lawyer became aware of the
ad, it was required to make sure that the ad conformed to the ethics rules)
[hereinafter Ethics Advisory Op.]; When Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online Profiles, Rules
on Communications, Advertising Apply, 14 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1668 (Nov. 18, 2009) (“According to the committee, ‘to “claim” one’s website
listing is to “place or disseminate” all communications made at or through that
listing after the time the listing is claimed.’ That step makes the lawyer
responsible for the information in the listing, it said. ‘Likewise, a lawyer who
adopts or endorses information on any similar web site becomes responsible for
conforming all information in the lawyer’s listing to the Rules of Professional
Conduct,’ the committee stated . . . . [A] lawyer assumes responsibility for the
content by requesting access to and updating it, beyond merely making
corrections to directory information.”) [hereinafter When Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online
Profiles].
65. See When Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online Profiles, supra note 64 (“[The
committee] reminded lawyers to adhere to Rule 8.4(a), which prohibits lawyers
from violating professional conduct rules through the acts of another. ‘Therefore,
a lawyer should monitor a “claimed” listing to keep all comments in conformity
with the Rules,’ the opinion states. If any part of the listing is improper and
cannot be removed, the lawyer should remove her entire listing, the committee
said.”).
66. The committee analyzed each of these elements separately and held that
the ethics rules applied to all of them, even though the lawyer did not provide
them. See Ethics Advisory Op., supra note 64 (“[A] lawyer may claim the website
listing, but all information contained therein (including peer endorsements,
client ratings, and Company X ratings) are subject to the rules governing
communication and advertising once the lawyer claims the listing. . . . A lawyer
may invite peers to rate the lawyer and may invite and allow the posting of peer
and client comments, but . . . the lawyer is responsible for their content.”); When
Lawyers ‘Claim’ Online Profiles, supra note 64 (“‘The committee cautioned . . .
that client comments may violate Rule 7.1 depending on their content. Rule
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of the content is the lawyer’s agent, the ethics rules are
preempted by federal law.67
These conflicts are an example of the unanticipated
consequences of new technologies and a very explicit
demonstration of the way that background property and
liability rules structure speech and speakers. Here the gap
between created and adopted speech is especially large. In
practice,
the general population has more leeway to make [ads] that
cross into murky territory. Consumer ads are sometimes
offensive and crude, and they often exaggerate the benefits of
the products made by the company that dangles the prize
money. The sponsor can try to distance itself from the
provocative content, while at the same time benefiting from the
attention the videos draw to the brand.68

This difference is then amplified by the legal regimes
applied to advertiser speech versus those applied to
consumer speech. Suppose a purely consumer-generated ad
says false things about a major competitor. Section 230
protects the manufacturer who hosts the ad on its website.
In theory, the competitor can still go after the original
consumer.69 But the competitor can’t take advantage of
strict liability for simple falsity under the Lanham Act, the
major source of private false advertising litigation, because
the Lanham Act only applies to false advertising by parties
in commercial competition with one another. The competitor
will have to use state tort law, which generally has higher,
defamation-like standards for liability. The consumer’s
statement will likely be treated as fully protected
7.1(d) prohibits a communication that ‘contains a testimonial,’ which the
committee defined as a statement by a client about an experience with the
lawyer. A lawyer should not solicit or allow publication of testimonials, the
committee declared. Furthermore, the opinion states that [the rules] usually
prohibit a client endorsement, which the committee characterized as ‘a more
general recommendation or statement of approval of the lawyer.’”).
67. See infra Part III.C. It is possible that an appropriately tailored
regulation might provide that, if a lawyer offered financial incentives for
favorable client comments, the ethics rules would apply without interference by
section 230, but that is a small subset of what the current rules purport to cover.
68. Story, supra note 60.
69. Even if the competitor wins a claim against the original speaker,
however, there is no obvious legal mechanism to compel the section 230immunized manufacturer to remove the ad.
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noncommercial speech, actionable only on a showing of
actual malice. And if the claim does not disparage the
competitor but simply falsely lauds the manufacturer, the
competitor may have no recourse at all.
Under such circumstances, advertisers have every
incentive to arbitrage the regulatory regime by burying
their promotional speech within user-generated speech.70 If
we simply equalized treatment, however, that would seem
to sound the death knell for most advertising regulation,
since it is unlikely that economically unrelated entities
engaged in noncommercial speech can constitutionally be
held strictly liable for falsity and required to substantiate
product claims.
The potential of user-generated ads to degrade (further)
the integrity of information is illustrated by the remarks of
one amateur filmmaker who submitted a video to the
Quiznos contest: “‘Quiznos led you to believe it was O.K. to
do it,’ [he] said. ‘It’s like mudslinging, in a sense. Like
politicians slinging mud back and forth at each other. I took
it that it was all fair in business.’”71 Effective advertising
70. See Goodman, supra note 55, at 686-87 (“Where brand owners sponsor
peer promotions but conceal their involvement, the resulting communication
mixes the commercial speech of the sponsor with the noncommercial speech of
the peer.”); id. at 699 (“[P]eer promotions engage consumers in new ways by
linking commercial and noncommercial speech.”); id. (“Peer promotions hide
speaker identity. The determination of ‘commercialness’ requires examination
not only of the content and context of speech, but also who is speaking and why.
In other words, . . . the identity of the speaker[] becomes a matter of
interpretation and investigation.”).
71. Story, supra note 60. One might speculate that the online environment
also removes the inhibitions against defamatory behavior that speakers might
otherwise have felt. Many people have observed the disinhibiting effects of
online communication, which may also affect speakers’ willingness to engage in
undisclosed marketing. Cf. Ken D. Kumayama, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51
ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 448-49 (2009) (discussing ways in which online environments
can facilitate antisocial behavior, including deception, and have both good and
bad disinhibiting effects on individual expression); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky &
Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1537, 1575 (2007) (“[T]he Internet has come to exacerbate this
dark side of anonymity due to its ‘disinhibiting effect’ on many speakers. Studies
show that even when an Internet user is not anonymous and knows the
recipient of his e-mail message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited
when engaged in “computer mediated communication” than in other types of
communications. The technology separates the speaker from the immediate
consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) lulling her to believe that there
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regulation requires specific attention to new attentiongetting techniques, and might eventually require a revision
of the CDA’s immunity provisions, at least for usergenerated promotional messages explicitly adopted or
further disseminated by commercial sellers.72
III. SPEAK FOR YOURSELF: ENDORSEMENT, PAYMENT AND
DISCLOSURE IN NEW MEDIA
A. The FTC Draws Lines Between Paid and Volunteer
Content
A related issue surrounding user-generated, advertiserfriendly content recently arose when the FTC updated its
endorsement and testimonial guidelines, which are
consolidated administrative statutory interpretations
intended to provide a basis for voluntary compliance. Along
with other significant changes, the revised guidelines
addressed social networking and other Internet media for
the first time. The basic question was how to apply the
FTC’s
traditional
disclosure
and
substantiation
will be no consequences. Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous
speakers, it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.”) (footnote
omitted); John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY &
BEHAV. 321, 321-22 (2004) (setting forth arguments that the Internet decreases
inhibitions on socially disapproved behavior).
72. There is already an analogy, though not a reassuring one, in
pharmaceutical companies’ use of studies, journal articles, and lectures to
“educate” doctors and thereby promote off-label use of FDA-approved drugs.
Finding that companies have First Amendment rights to distribute others’
speech, several court decisions have proved extremely hostile to FDA
regulations that limit such off-label promotions. See Washington Legal Found.
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60-65 (D.D.C. 1998), further proceedings 36 F.
Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), further proceedings sub nom. Washington Legal
Found. v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999), vacated, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.
Cir. 2000). Such practices show how sellers can engage in arbitrage to defeat
restrictions on what they can say directly. And arbitrage tends to break down;
the maker of Botox has now filed suit to invalidate the regulations preventing it
from engaging in off-label promotion directly. See Allergan v. United States, No.
1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009); Brief for the National Spasmodic
Torticollis Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plantiff, Allergan v. United
States, No. 1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/litigation/briefs/112509Allergan_US_Amicus.pdf;
Natasha Singer, Botox Maker’s Suit Cites Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009,
at B3.
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requirements to new media and new forms of endorsement.
Applying already existing principles,73 the revised
guidelines require: (1) substantiation for ad claims made by
endorsers, even in new media, and (2) disclosure of any
endorsement relationship that wouldn’t be obvious from
context (as it is obvious when a spokesperson appears in a
traditional 30-second TV ad). When a relationship between
a blogger and an advertiser is of sufficient economic
significance, the blogger is an endorser and that
relationship needs to be disclosed.74 In addition, the
advertiser could be held liable for unsubstantiated claims
made by an endorser.75
The FTC was very concerned with practices in which
companies pay people to promote a product or service by
praising it or using it as part of a seemingly noncommercial
interaction in ordinary settings. A typical example:
In Spring 2009, Royal Caribbean was criticized for posting
positive reviews on travel review sites with a viral marketing
team, the ‘Royal Champions,’ which was comprised of fans who
posted positive comments on various sites such as Cruise

73. See, e.g., FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,125 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter FTC Endorsement Guides] (“The Guides have
always defined ‘endorsements’ by focusing on the message consumers take from
the speech at issue.”) (citation omitted); id. at 53,126 (“The Guides merely
elucidate the Commission’s interpretation . . . but do not expand (or limit) its
application to various forms of marketing.”). The FTC had already applied the
principles of its earlier Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, which were issued in 1980, to online situations.
See, e.g., In re TrendMark Inc., 126 F.T.C. 375 (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/06/9723255.pkg.htm (consent order arising from
failure to adequately disclose in email and on website that endorsers of NeuroThin and Lipo-Thin had a material connection with the sellers); Letter from
Jodie Bernstein, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Kathryn C.
Montgomery, President, and Jeffrey A. Chester, Executive Director of the
Center
for
Media
Education
(July
15,
1997),
available
at
http://ftc.gov/os/1997/07/cenmed.htm (responding to its petition requesting
investigation of and enforcement action based on nondisclosure of sponsorships
of the Web site KidsCom).
74. FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,142-43 (§ 255.5 &
Examples 7 & 8).
75. Id. at 53,139 (Example 5).
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Critic. In return for positive postings, the Royal Champions
were rewarded with free cruises and other perks.76

Short-form social networking services like Twitter offer an
especially promising opportunity for sponsored ads. As the
New York Times reported,
[i]t is perhaps the last frontier in advertising —getting regular
people to send a sentence or two of text, on behalf of paying
advertisers, to their friends and admirers. The idea . . . is that
people trust recommendations from those they know and
respect, while they increasingly ignore nearly ever[y] other
kind of ad message in print, on television and online.77

Large companies like Amazon are getting into the business,
with the hopes of being able to target small, special interest
groups through their friends as readily as advertisers
already address the mass market.78 One marketer explained
that “‘[a]ll we are trying to do is get consumers to become
marketers for us.’”79
Consumers trust commercial messages less than
noncommercial ones, creating incentives for undisclosed
promotion and resulting harms to consumers. Fake blogs
and similar user-imitating content are unfortunately
common, and are covered by the disclosure requirements.80
76. Gregory J. Hessinger et al., Advertising & Marketing, in NETWORK
INTERFERENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE COMMERCIAL RISKS AND REWARDS OF THE
SOCIAL MEDIA PHENOMENON 3, 6 (Douglas J. Wood et al. eds., 2009),
http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/social_media_e-version.pdf.
77. Brad Stone, A Friend’s Tweet Could Be an Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2009,
at BU4.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Candida Harty & Amy Mudge, FTC + Fake Blogs = Advertisers Might Get
a
Flogging,
CONSUMER
ADVER.
LAW
BLOG,
Nov.
6,
2009,
http://www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2009/11/ftc-fake-blogs-advertisersmight-get-a-flogging.html (“[M]any flogs [fake blogs] are carefully crafted to look
exactly like a real blog complete with user comments and lively chat. The flogs
will even include a few somewhat negative or skeptical comments regarding the
product or service for sale to increase credibility. . . . Mary Engle, Director of the
FTC’s Division of Advertising Practices says that the agency is targeting
floggers, telling MSNBC that ‘[a]dvertising always has to be clear that it’s
advertising’ and ‘[a]n ad disguised as a blog, or a blog where companies get
people to pose as satisfied customers and write reviews, both are deceptive.’”);
Bob Sullivan, “Fakeosphere” Latest Web Trap for Consumers, THE RED TAPE
CHRONICLES, Nov. 4, 2009, http://redtape.msnbc.com/2009/11/latest-web-trap-
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The problem of deception may be even worse, however,
when a source that is sometimes independent accepts
compensation for positive reviews without disclosing the
underlying business relationship. Unlike the explicitly
advertiser-adopted content discussed in the previous
section, hidden relationships may give advertisers excessive
credibility by using apparently independent sources to
confirm the advertiser’s message.81 The social science
evidence is persuasive that source matters. Helen Norton
summarizes:
for-consumers-the-fakeosphere.html (“Internet marketing veteran and analyst
Jay Weintraub says fake blogs—or flogs—fake news sites and manufactured
testimonials are the fastest-growing segment of Internet advertising. He thinks
it’s a $500 million-a-year industry— and he compares it to the explosive growth
of spam a decade ago. ‘I don’t think people realize how big this has become, and
how quickly,’ said Weintraub, adding that a popular top flog campaign can
generate 10,000 daily sales.”).
81. See Goodman, supra note 55, at 705 (“Marketing theory predicts . . . that
consumers will be more inclined to believe promotions when they are not clearly
sourced by the brand owner. Marketing authorities instruct sponsors to keep a
low profile in Web 2.0 promotions because speech that is or seems to be pure
peer is more credible. If this is true, then peer promotions would seem to be
highly credible and therefore potentially harmful if misrepresenting the facts.
Even more so than traditional advertising, consumers would be at risk of
‘uninformed acquiescence’ to the advertiser’s promotional scheme.”) (footnotes
omitted). But see Memorandum from John P. Feldman, Reed Smith, LLP, at 3
(Dec.
1,
2009), available
at
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/uploads
/file/Feldman%20Memorandum%20December%201%20on%20FTC%20Guides_d
oc.pdf (“The FTC has presented no evidence that consumers are being deceived
by bloggers who review products and services on the Internet.”). On the general
power of word of mouth marketing, see, e.g., Richard W. Easley, Virtual
Communities . . . The Power of Word-of-Mouth Transmission Via the Internet, J.
INTERNET MKTG., Mar. 2002, http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jim/020304.htm; Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY 404, 409-10 (Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, eds. 2008) (“For some industries . . . [consumer]
word of mouth can make or break businesses. . . . Due to their sociability or
expertise, some consumers (sometimes called ‘brand advocates’) are more
influential than other consumers.”); Eric Goldman, Twitter, Email and Brand
Engagement,
TECH.
&
MKTG.
LAW
BLOG,
June
17,
2009,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/06/twitter_email_a.htm (“Twitter has
[a] really important benefit for brands. Folks are often willing to retweet a
message—even a commercial message—thereby sharing it to their entire
follower base in ways that these same folks would never forward a commercial
email to hundreds of their friends. And this type of word-of-mouth marketing is
the holy grail of marketing because of the extra imprimatur of having the
message validated by someone in the reader’s social network.”).
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[E]vidence from cognitive psychology and related fields reveals
that individuals often use a message’s source as a mental
shortcut, or heuristic, for evaluating its quality. Studies
confirm that the more credible a speaker, the more likely her
message will be effective, regardless of its content. Because
speakers perceived as unpopular and/or unreliable will have
more difficulty persuading listeners, they may be wise to seek
the imprimatur of more trustworthy sources . . . . Moreover,
the perception that a message is endorsed by such sources can
help dispel onlookers’ suspicion of perspectives understood to
be in the speaker’s own interest.82

The appearance of voluntariness makes consumer
speech more persuasive than the advertiser’s own obviously
self-interested speech.83 Studies of Internet use in particular
replicate this result. To take one significant example,
consumers seek out and trust health information from other
people (apparently) like them much more than they seek out
and trust information from pharmaceutical companies.84
82. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying
Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see
also Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias
Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and
Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460,
464 (1994) (finding that, under many circumstances, product evaluations
supposedly from Consumer Reports were more persuasive than the identical
evaluations supposedly from a retailer); Roobina Ohanian, The Impact of
Celebrity Spokespersons’ Perceived Image on Consumers’ Intention to Purchase,
31 J. ADVERTISING RES. 46, 47, 52 (1991) (noting that friends are perceived as
more trustworthy than sales personnel because of the potential conflict of
interest, and that the consumer “does not associate a high level of
trustworthiness with individuals [such as celebrity endorsers] who get paid
handsomely to promote a product”); Elaine Walster et al., On Increasing the
Persuasiveness of a Low Prestige Communicator, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 325, 327 (1966) available at http://www2.hawaii.edu/~elaineh/14.pdf
(stating that perceived self-interest decreases the credibility of a source, while
perceived altruism increases it, whether the source is generally low in
credibility (a criminal) or high in credibility (a prosecutor)).
83. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1, 8 (arguing that consumers are wary of, and thus likely to discount,
claims made by advertisers out of the advertisers’ self-interest).
84. Noah Elkin, How America Searches: Health and Wellness, ICROSSING 15,
Jan. 2008, available at http://www.icrossing.com/articles/How%20America%
20Searches%20%20Health%20and%20Wellness.pdf (showing substantial use of
user-generated content and online social communities for health and wellness
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Advertisers can also take advantage of the phenomenon
of social proof: people have a powerful tendency to put faith
in the wisdom of crowds, which viral marketing can
simulate.85 Multiple sources endorsing the same product are
more persuasive than a single source repeated multiple
times.86 Using apparently different sources is especially
useful for strengthening initially less-plausible claims. Even
better from the marketer’s perspective, people don’t
understand why they find the repeated, multiple-source
claim plausible. They attribute it to the inherent truth
value of the claim rather than to the repetition, making
them particularly vulnerable to manipulation of this type.87
With a wide swath of user-generated content, in the
absence of disclosure a consumer can’t tell whether a
reviewer was compensated for the review or was simply
sharing her opinion because she believed everyone is
entitled to it.88 As Mark Bartholomew’s piece in this volume
information); id. at 16 (“Consumers rank pharmaceutical companies and
television as the two least trusted sources for information about health-related
issues and questions, and place them in the bottom tier in terms of sources that
influence their medication choices.”).
85. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 99-102 (5th ed.
Pearson 2009) (1985); Norton, supra note 82, at 593 (“Some onlookers also rely
on the public’s reaction to a message as a shortcut for evaluating its content,
using widespread acceptance or audience enthusiasm to gauge a message’s
quality.”).
86. Anne L. Roggeveen & Gita Venkataramani Johar, Perceived Source
Variability Versus Familiarity: Testing Competing Explanations for the Truth
Effect, 12 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 81, 87 (2002) (“[B]elief in a claim is greater
when it is perceived as coming from two different sources (vs. a single source).”);
id. at 90 (“When claims are less plausible, feelings of familiarity engendered by
repetition alone are not sufficient to enhance belief in the claim. However,
exposure to the less plausible claim multiple times, each time from a different
source, does enhance belief in repeated versus new claims.”).
87. Id. at 90 (“[T]he truth effect does occur for seemingly less plausible
statements; however this occurs only under conditions where the multiple
repetitions can be attributed to multiple sources. . . . [S]ubjects had no access to
their use of number of sources in rating the truth value. Instead, subjects seized
on the most likely explanation for their ratings—the plausibility of the claim. It
appears that the use of source variability is an automatic process.”).
88. See FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at,53,136. Press Release,
FTC, FTC Facts for Business, The FTC’s Revised Endorsement Guides: What
People
Are
Asking
2
(June
2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
pubs/business/adv/bus71.pdf [hereinafter What People Are Asking] (justifying
disclosure requirements for bloggers who act as endorsers). “[M]any bloggers
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explains, people routinely use brands and brand claims to
establish their own identities and social positioning, and are
understood as doing so by their audiences. Even the most
cynical observer doesn’t expect that everyone she sees has
been paid to use, wear, praise, etc. the things they are
using, wearing, praising, and so on. Given that companies
exist to sell their products and services, the default
expectation is that the money has flowed from consumer to
seller by the consumer’s choice, and not the reverse. As a
result, in the absence of disclosure, consumers will not
assume that an apparently independent endorsement is in
fact sponsored.
The FTC’s announced intent is not to change traditional
product reviews, but to ensure that marketing on social
networks and (apparently) personal blogs is disclosed.89
Some claim infringement on free speech, while others see
FTC attention toward bloggers as a sign of their maturity
and perhaps growing professionalism. If bloggers who are
compensated for touting products tell their readers so, that
may increase the level of trustworthiness both of their own
posts and of posts where no disclosure is made, because
who mention products don’t receive anything for their reviews and don’t get a
commission if readers click on a link to buy a product”. Id. at 2.
89. See Amy E. Bivens, Endorsements Guides Not Meant to Address
Traditional Reviews Online, FTC Official Says, 15 Electronic Com. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1516 (Oct. 21, 2009) (quoting Mary Engle, the FTC’s associate director for
advertising practices: “‘We are concerned that if an advertiser pays or provides
other incentives to an individual in exchange for writing about a product on
MySpace or a personal blog, there is nothing there to suggest how an individual
got a product or a mechanism for consumers to evaluate connections between
reviewers and advertisers’”; “[t]hat concern is less prevalent among websites
that resemble offline product reviews, [she] elaborated, because consumers
understand the connection between traditional reviewers and brands.”); Fawn
Johnson, FTC to Target Advertisers, Not Bloggers, in New Guidelines, NASDAQ,
Oct.
14,
2009,
http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-newsstory.aspx?storyid=200910141225dowjonesdjonline000606&title=ftc-to-targetadvertisersnot-bloggersin-new-guidelines
(“‘We
will
be
focusing
any
enforcements on advertisers, not on individual endorsers,’ Engle said . . . . [T]he
FTC’s focus has always been on ‘bad actor’ advertisers. ‘If a marketing company
is paying people per blog or per tweet and not disclosing that in a large
marketing scheme, then we can bring an investigation and that can lead to a
lawsuit against the company,’ Engle said. Bloggers are expected to post whether
they are paid for a positive post or if they received free products to review, ‘but
the primary obligation is on the advertiser to tell the blogger to do it,’ Engle
said.”).
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readers will be more able to determine when an opinion is
truly based on an independent assessment.90 Without
regulation, a market for lemons will develop—a
deterioration in the credibility of public discourse, because
audiences won’t be able to trust that a stated opinion is
independent and sincerely held.91
B. Theoretical Concerns Relating to Disclosure and
Substantiation
Debates over speech labeled “commercial” for purposes
of First Amendment analysis often focus on the content of
such speech, not its source, but source is also a puzzle.
Underlying both the specific set of regulations at issue here
and the divide in the constitutional status of commercial
and noncommercial speech is the idea that there is
something different about selling as the objective of speech.
It naturally follows that we have to be prepared to decide
what counts as selling. With respect to endorsements, the
theory is that he who pays the piper calls the tune—even if
the piper has license to improvise. This section explores in
further detail the challenge that new forms of endorsement
pose to commercial speech doctrine.
1. Can Money Buy Noncommercial Speech? The new
guidelines offer opportunities to consider what is different
about commercial speech. People paid to speak well of a
product might lack an autonomy interest in expressing this
preference, as Robert Post has argued, thus falling within
conventional definitions of commercial speakers.92 It is

90. See, e.g., Kayleen Schaefer, Fessing Up About Freebies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2009, at E6.
91. George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, in EXPLORATIONS IN PRAGMATIC ECONOMICS: SELECTED
PAPERS OF GEORGE A. AKERLOF (AND CO-AUTHORS) 27, 33-34 (2005).
92. Post, Constitutional Status, supra note 20, at 12 (“[W]e most naturally
understand persons who are advertising products for sale as seeking to advance
their commercial interests rather than as participating in the public life of the
nation. . . . [T]his is not ultimately a judgment about the motivations of
particular persons, but instead about the social significance of a certain kind of
speech.”). One might argue that newspapers, too, are careful not to anger
advertisers. Still, the advertiser’s degree of influence over both topic choice and
perspective, as well as consumer reactions, may justify disclosure-specific
regulations. See infra Part III.B.2.
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therefore important to ask whether the new guidelines truly
cover commercial speech or noncommercial speech.
The activities of the advertiser, if they are speech,
appear to be commercial speech: designed to promote a
product. Perhaps they are even less than that. Providing a
free sample, or a hotel stay or other goodwill-inducing
amenities, doesn’t seem like speech at all even if these acts
have effects on the ultimate composition and balance of
speech in the marketplace of ideas. After all, taxes and
many other government policies affect the composition and
balance of speech, but that doesn’t make every government
act a speech regulation.93 One could argue that the FTC
guidelines are different in that they are designed to affect
the content of speech (that is, whether the speech contains a
disclosure of affiliation and follows substantiation
requirements), but that focuses analysis on the effects of the
guideline on bloggers’ speech—considered next—and does
not require the conclusion that the advertiser’s goodwillseeking behavior is itself speech.
What about directly paying for a positive blog review?
Money can be speech, or at least can be treated like speech,
when it’s used to buy speech.94 In this context, the
93. But if money is speech, why isn’t a car (also worth money) speech? The
problem, ultimately, is with the equation of money with speech, as has been
noted many times before.
94. Even in the campaign finance reform context—involving heavily
protected political speech—the Supreme Court has so far upheld restrictions on
the amount of money donors can give directly to candidates and, crucially, it has
also upheld disclosure requirements, on the theory that such requirements have
important democratic discourse benefits without interfering with the free flow of
the substance of the speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 914-16 (2010) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to disclosure
requirements). “[T]he public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a
candidate shortly before an election,” making “the informational interest alone .
. . sufficient to justify application” of disclosure requirements to ads promoting a
political film. Id. at 915-16. See also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93, 96 (2003) (upholding requirement of disclosure of identities of anyone
who contributed substantially to making electioneering ads); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (holding that although disclosure of contributor
identities might deter some political contributions, the justifications were
sufficient to satisfy “exacting scrutiny” under the First Amendment); cf.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995) (“Disclosure of an
expenditure and its use, without more, reveals far less information. It may be
information that a person prefers to keep secret, and undoubtedly it often gives
away something about the spender’s political views. Nonetheless, even though
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advertiser’s money would be commercial speech, designed to
promote a commercial transaction. Given that commercial
speech doctrine favors disclosure and that substantiation is
already required for ad claims, the new guidelines don’t
seem problematic from the perspective of the advertiser.
What, then, of the blogger’s speech? If the blogger were
a copywriter, it would seem obvious that her speech was
commercial even if the transaction it promoted wouldn’t
provide any further benefit to her. She would be an agent of
the advertiser for commercial speech purposes and could
claim no greater speech rights than the advertiser itself,
just as an ad-supported newspaper couldn’t assert greater
rights to run ads than the advertiser could.95 At most, the
blogger might be able to claim that the FTC could not
enforce its regulation directly against her without satisfying
the more exacting standards for requiring disclosures on
noncommercial speech. But if the FTC can penalize an
advertiser
whose
compensated
promoters
make
unsubstantiated claims or fail to disclose the existence of
compensation, then it can achieve much the same result, in
terms of advertiser incentives and deterrence, as if it
regulated bloggers directly. Indeed, the FTC has announced
its intention to focus enforcement on advertisers
themselves. And this result is not shocking: we already
accept that noncommercial speakers like traditional
newspapers can be held liable for the commercial speech
they facilitate in certain circumstances, such as when a

money may ‘talk,’ its speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative
than a handbill . . .”). Campaign finance laws do not necessarily require on-ad
disclosure, but the greater burden of on-ad disclosure is balanced by the greater
benefit to the audience. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“[T]he very thing that makes reporting less inhibiting than notice in the ad
itself—fewer people are likely to see the report than the notice—makes
reporting a less effective method of conveying information that by hypothesis
the voting public values.”).
95. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002) (“[C]ommercial
speech generally or typically is directed to an audience of persons who may be
influenced by that speech to engage in a commercial transaction with the
speaker or the person on whose behalf the speaker is acting.”) (emphasis added);
id. (“Economic motivation likewise implies that the speech is intended to lead to
commercial transactions, which in turn assumes that the speaker and the target
audience are persons who will engage in those transactions, or their agents or
intermediaries.”) (emphasis added).
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newspaper runs an ad for housing or employment that
discriminates on the basis of race or sex.96
Ellen Goodman argues that the paid blogger is engaging
in “mixed” speech, making determination of whether her
speech is commercial a difficult proposition.97 By contrast, I
would argue that a significant economic benefit—whether
past or expected—conferred by the subject of the speech is
enough to make the blogger’s speech commercial for
purposes of First Amendment analysis, at least when the
issue is whether the economic relationship between the
blogger and the advertiser should be disclosed.98 That is, not
all portions of a particular post might be commercial speech,
and not all regulations on that post might be
constitutional;99 but a disclosure requirement focused on the
96. Congress made it unlawful to “make, print, or publish, or cause to be
made, printed, or published” discriminatory ads for housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)
(2006). Specifically, Congress did not exempt ads run by individuals who were
exempt from the underlying antidiscrimination requirement; such individuals
are required to find ways to discriminate without the assistance of publishers,
42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (2006); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386-89 (1973); Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda
Abraham, Now You See Them, Now You Don’t: The Legal Field and Newspaper
Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted Ads 1965-75, 31 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 905, 911-17 (2006). See generally Nicholas Pedriana, Help Wanted
NOW: Legal Resources, the Women’s Movement, and the Battle over SexSegregated Job Advertisements, 51 SOC. PROBS. 182 (2004) (detailing the events
leading up to the Pittsburgh Press decision).
97. Goodman, supra note 55, at 699.
98. Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (“[I]t does not resolve
where the line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge . . . that an
organization for which the rights of free speech and free assembly are claimed is
one ‘engaged in business activities’ or that the individual who leads it in
exercising these rights receives compensation for doing so. . . . These
comparisons are at once too simple, too general, and too inaccurate to be
determinative. Where the line shall be placed in a particular application rests,
not on such generalities, but on the concrete clash of particular interests . . . .”).
99. The fact that some elements of a post constituted noncommercial
speech—discussing, for example, a blogger’s political beliefs-would not prevent
regulation of the commercial elements. When commercial and noncommercial
elements are “inextricably intertwined,” treating the speech as noncommercial
is appropriate, but the Supreme Court has limited this principle to cases in
which there is practical or legal compulsion to combine the two types. Bd. of Trs.
of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (“No law of man or of
nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home
economics, or to teach home economics without selling housewares.”).
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potential for deception and distortion of consumer decisions
based on the economic relationship between the underlying
advertiser and the speaker is consistent with the
justification for commercial speech doctrine.100 As Justice
Stevens wrote in advocating a functional definition of
acceptable commercial speech regulations: “When a State
regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information,
the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the reasons
for according constitutional protection to commercial speech
and therefore justifies less than strict review.”101
Focusing on commercial harms and the preservation of
a fair bargaining process can help explain why undisclosed
sponsorship or unsubstantiated claims made by a party
compensated for making those claims can be regulated.102 I
100. The FTC’s requirement that sponsored speech follow the same
substantiation requirements that conventional advertising does is more
interesting than the disclosure requirement, but follows from the same agency
principles. See discussion infra Part III.C. If substantiation can be required at
all, it can be required of statements made by an advertiser’s agents. See Porter
& Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979) (“The [Federal Trade
Commission Act] does not make mental state an element of violation and
creates no exemption from liability for parties not involved in the creation of the
false advertising or for unwitting disseminators of false advertising.”); id.
(“‘[T]hat an advertiser made its representations in good or bad faith is not
determinative of whether such statements are deceptive and misleading.’”)
(quoting Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925
(6th Cir. 1968)); cf. Delcianna J. Winders, Note, Combining Reflexive Law and
False Advertising Law to Standardize “Cruelty-Free” Labeling of Cosmetics, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 454, 469-70 (2006) (“[A] manufacturer that has verified that its
‘cruelty-free’ claims are accurate might bring suit [under the Lanham Act]
against a company that claims its products are ‘cruelty-free’ while continuing to
hire subcontractors to perform animal-based ingredient testing.”). See generally
Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227 (2007)
(explaining why a system that regulates false and misleading commercial
speech without First Amendment scrutiny and with no heightened scienter
requirement for fraud is desirable).
101. 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (per
curiam) (Stevens, J.).
102. Id. at 502 (Stevens, J.) (“It is the State’s interest in protecting consumers
from ‘commercial harms’ that provides ‘the typical reason why commercial
speech can be subject to greater governmental regulation than noncommercial
speech.’” (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
426 (1993)).
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will take up the question of the blogger as the advertiser’s
representative, and the extent to which the common law of
agency isn’t the limit of appropriate regulation, further in
the discussion of section 230 of the CDA in Section III.C
below.
2. Speaker-Based Discrimination? A related issue is
whether the regulation, though potentially acceptable, is
unconstitutionally underinclusive because it does not
require the same disclosures for mass media reviewers who
also receive freebies or whose employers are paid for the
endorsements.103 The argument would be based on a
principle embraced by the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul: even when an entire class of speech, such as
fighting words, may constitutionally be regulated,
constitutional infirmity may arise if the regulator chooses a
subclass on the wrong basis.104 The harm in R.A.V. was, the
Court believed, viewpoint discrimination, because the law in
that case barred racially discriminatory fighting words and
not racially egalitarian fighting words, thus treating
speakers with different viewpoints differently.105
103. Pay-for-placement deals are growing in traditional media for many of the
same reasons that advertising is creeping into user-generated content. See
Goodman, supra note 11, at 142 (arguing that the increasing difficulty of
capturing audience attention in a media-fragmented world make payola,
product placement, and other advertiser-friendly but secretive practices more
attractive as ways for advertisers to get attention and media producers to fund
their productions while traditional ad revenues fall). Goodman argues that
disclosure policies should be technology-neutral, though she does not suggest
that variation is constitutionally infirm. See id. at 145, 151.
Perhaps there should be a general disclosure requirement when, for
example, an advertiser funds a novel. Given the constitutionality of disclosure
requirements in political ads, there would seem to be no constitutional barrier,
assuming that the government articulated a sufficient justification for novelistic
disclosures. Product placement does exist in novels. See David D. Kirkpatrick,
Now, Many Words From Our Sponsor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, at A1
(describing “marquee” author Fay Weldon’s acceptance of an undisclosed sum of
money to feature Italian jewelry company Bulgari in her 2001 novel THE
BULGARI CONNECTION). Kirkpatrick explains that while this advertising
arrangement was believed to be the first for the book industry, “the current crop
of ‘chick lit’ novels and memoirs about the lives of young women offers potential
for touting vodka, cigarettes, clothing and other brands, [Weldon’s agent] said.
‘The sky is the limit.’”. Id.
104. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-84 (1991).
105. Id. at 391-92.
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There does not seem to be viewpoint discrimination in
the new FTC guides, but there is (arguably) speaker
discrimination between old and new media, which often
seems much like content discrimination and thus might
seem to require some sort of credible justification.106 An
unsympathetic view of the new rule is that it treats nontraditional sources as less trustworthy than old media, even
though consumers deceived by undisclosed connections
between bloggers and advertisers may also be deceived
about the ways in which undisclosed complimentary
products and related perks influence newspaper and
magazine writers.
The FTC, however, maintains that there is no difference
at all in treatment. In response to the question, “Do the
Guides hold online reviewers to a higher standard than
reviewers for paper-and-ink publications?” the FTC states:
No. The Guides apply across the board. The issue is—and
always has been—whether the audience understands the
reviewer’s relationship to the company whose products are being
reviewed. If the audience gets the relationship, a disclosure isn’t
needed. For a review in a newspaper, on TV, or on a website
with similar content, it’s usually clear to the audience that the
reviewer didn’t buy the product being reviewed. It’s the
reviewer’s job to write his or her opinion and no one thinks they
bought the product—for example, a book or movie ticket—
themselves. But on a personal blog, a social networking page, or
in similar media, the reader may not expect the reviewer to have
a relationship with the company whose products are mentioned.
Disclosure of that relationship helps readers decide how much
weight to give the review.107
106. But see Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech
Curriculum Ignores Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 MO.
L. REV. 59 (2005) (surveying the ways in which broadcast media have
traditionally been treated differently than print media, as a perfectly acceptable
speaker-based distinction at the core of modern First Amendment law).
107. What People Are Asking, supra note 88, at 3; see also FTC Endorsement
Guides, supra note 73, at 53,136 (“The Commission acknowledges that bloggers
may be subject to different disclosure requirements than reviewers in
traditional media. In general, under usual circumstances, the Commission does
not consider reviews published in traditional media (i.e., where a newspaper,
magazine, or television or radio station with independent editorial responsibility
assigns an employee to review various products or services as part of his or her
official duties, and then publishes those reviews) to be sponsored advertising
messages. Accordingly, such reviews are not ‘endorsements’ within the meaning
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Moreover, there is not a significant problem of newspapers
and other traditional media getting paid to place favorable
reviews without disclosure,108 and there are in fact already
some disclosure laws governing broadcast media.109
of the Guides. Under these circumstances, the Commission believes, knowing
whether the media entity that published the review paid for the item in
question would not affect the weight consumers give to the reviewer’s
statements.”) (footnotes omitted).
108. As Ellen Goodman points out, newspapers (and magazines) generally
adhere to a convention of putting “advertisement” prominently on ads otherwise
formatted to look like editorial content, in order to decrease the risks of
deception. They do this to comply with a journalistic norm and with an
admittedly underenforced law. Goodman, supra note 11, at 151. But see Josef
Adalian, NBC’s ‘Southland’ Pushes Ad Limits in L.A. Times, TELEVISION WEEK,
Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.tvweek.com/news/ 2009/04/nbcs_southland_pushes_ad
_limit.php; Bob Steele, L.A. Times Pitched NBC on ‘Southland’ Front Page Ad
Concept,
POYNTERONLINE:
EVERYDAY
ETHICS,
Apr.
10,
2009,
http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id=67&aid=161630. In tough economic
times, the temptation to violate traditional newspaper norms may prove too
great to resist. If newspaper publishers develop a problem with undisclosed
advertiser-sponsored content, then they, too, should be prepared for the FTC’s
interest.
109. See Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,136 (noting that the FTC
would take a different view of traditional media reviews if the reviewer received
benefits directly from the manufacturer or its agent); Goodman, supra note 11,
at 84 (federal law bars secret payments to radio stations to play music, and
undisclosed payments to broadcasters to feature products or story lines). The
Communications Act requires broadcasters to disclose sponsors who provide any
type of valuable consideration, though free products or services are exempt if
they have minimal value. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006) (requiring broadcasters to
disclose to their listeners or viewers if matter has been aired in exchange for
money, services or other valuable consideration, though, subject to certain
exceptions, no disclosure is necessary for “any service or property furnished
without charge or at nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a
broadcast . . .”); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2008) (detailing broadcasters’
responsibilities); see also 47 U.S.C. § 508 (payola disclosure provision requiring
that, when anyone provides or promises to provide money, services or other
consideration to someone to include program matter in a broadcast, that fact
must be disclosed in advance of the broadcast); Sponsorship Identification Rules
and Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10682 (2008) (notice of inquiry and
proposed rulemaking). The FCC has occasionally enforced its rules against
failure to disclose the source of paid programming such as Department of
Education-funded promotion of No Child Left Behind and company-generated
video news releases that look like standard news reporting. See, e.g., Comcast
Corp., 07 D.A. 4005 (2007) (notice of apparent liability), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/ 2007/DA-07-4005A1.html; Sonshine Family
Television, Inc., 07 F.C.C. 152 (2007) (notice of apparent liability), available at
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This justification discounts the potentially distorting
role of special access—the way that getting free movie
tickets to a preview or other forms of special treatment
might distort reporters’ reactions by generating goodwill in
pretty much the same way that gifts directly to bloggers or
reporters can. But that is just a more specific version of the
general criticism that speech is influenced by all sorts of
factors, such that commercial speech is no different than
noncommercial speech. As long as the divide in
constitutional status between the two types persists, it
should be reasonable for the FTC to determine that direct
gifts require disclosure.
The undisclosed sponsorship problem in new media is
also more of a concern because of bloggers’ greater
heterogeneity. In the absence of a disclosure requirement, a
consumer can’t reasonably distinguish the bloggers who are
promoting products and services because they like them
from the ones who are doing so because they are being
paid.110 Readers cannot tell which reviewers offering
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2007/FCC-07-152A1.html; Letter of Citation to the
Graham
Williams
Group,
07
D.A.
3351
(2007),
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/Orders/2007/DA-07-3351A1.html.
110. See FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,135 (“[A] consumergenerated endorsement [on a blog] appears in a medium that does not make
[the] association with the advertiser apparent to consumers.”); id. at 53,134
(“[O]ne factor in determining whether the connection between an advertiser and
its endorsers should be disclosed is the type of vehicle being used to disseminate
that endorsement—specifically, whether or not the nature of that medium is
such that consumers are likely to recognize the statement as an advertisement
(that is, as sponsored speech). Thus, although disclosure of compensation may
not be required when a celebrity or expert appears in a conventional television
advertisement, endorsements by these individuals in other media might
warrant such disclosure.”); What People Are Asking, supra note 88, at 2 (“[T]he
financial arrangements between some bloggers and advertisers may be apparent
to industry insiders, but not to everyone else who reads a blog.… [E]ven if some
readers are aware of these deals, many readers aren’t.”). Others agree with the
FTC that consumers are not yet certain how to interpret social media and other
Internet sources, and thus are vulnerable to deception from undisclosed
connections. See Sullivan, supra note 81 (“Surprisingly, inserting an extra step
into the process—fake testimonials and blogs—dramatically improves
[responses to ads], [an Internet marketer] said. ‘Fifteen years people have been
trying to market online, this proved to be key,’ he said. ‘The biggest difference is
that somebody realized that blogging as a medium had seeped into
consciousness and become like TV news, had become a trusted source. The
average person doesn’t realize blogging can be easily manipulated.’”).
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opinions on an auto-focused website have been
compensated. They can more readily evaluate the more
familiar role of the newspaper car columnist. One might
argue that the risk of deception is lower with unfamiliar or
new media, but the social science evidence suggests the
contrary. People don’t use old coping strategies as well
against new forms of persuasion.111 Moreover, even as the
Internet ages, the problem of heterogeneity—the inability to
figure out which ten out of every hundred reviewers are
paid shills—will continue to be a problem not present in
more traditional media, which cannot and do not present
one hundred reviews of the same thing.
Even R.A.V. recognized that a regulator can
legitimately target a subset of regulable speech, as long as
that subset is of greater concern because of the reason the
overall category is regulable in the first place.112 So, if
potential deception over sponsorship is a worse problem
with user-generated content than with traditional
commercial media, then the inequality argument loses force
(though improved disclosure requirements for traditional
media might also be justified). This conclusion may be
particularly persuasive with respect to a disclosure
requirement, given that it does not outright ban any speech
and is not a significant burden on a speaker.
3. The Benefits and Burdens of Disclosure. Disclosure is,
in fact, a constitutionally favored method of commercial
speech regulation because it supposedly improves the
quality of speech without necessarily interfering with the

111. DAVID M. BOUSH, DECEPTION IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
DECEPTIVE PERSUASION AND CONSUMER SELF-PROTECTION 16-17, 189 (2009)
(deception protection strategies are context-specific and do not transfer well
across situations, especially in new media).
112. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (“When the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to
support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection,
is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. To
illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most
patently offensive in its prurience—i.e., that which involves the most lascivious
displays of sexual activity.”).
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speaker’s own legitimate interests in conveying truthful
information.113 As Seth Kreimer explains,
[some First Amendment] cases suggest that the same words
from different sources should be accorded different weights, and
perhaps different meanings. The ability to conceal this
information from the public, in this view, is a means of
manipulation by which speakers gain their objects without
public consent. This emphasis on origin accords with our
everyday experience as lawyers and citizens. Witnesses are
impeached or accredited by showing their background, and the
weight of opposing counsel’s assurances may depend on
counsel’s character. Our reaction to a request to sign a petition

113. In Va. Bd. of Pharmacy,v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, the Court held
that commercial speech could be required to “include such additional
information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being
deceptive.” 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). See also Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985) (“In requiring attorneys who
advertise their willingness to represent clients on a contingent-fee basis to state
that the client may have to bear certain expenses even if he loses, Ohio has not
attempted to prevent attorneys from conveying information to the public; it has
only required them to provide somewhat more information than they might
otherwise be inclined to present. . . . [A]n advertiser’s rights are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonable related to the
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”); cf. Doe v. Reed, 130
S.Ct. 2811 (2010) (upholding facial constitutionality of identity disclosure
requirement in the context of political petitions in order to avoid fraud and
foster government transparency and accountability); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S.
465, 480-81 (1987) (upholding a law requiring disclosure of foreign origin for
films attempting to alter American foreign policy because it was a valid method
of enabling the public to better evaluate the film; in reality, to enjoin the
mandatory disclosure of the film’s origin actually “with[held] information from
the public”); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (holding
that at least for “highly visible” political advertising, the government has a
compelling interest in notifying voters of an advertisement’s source); Viereck v.
United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (“[T]he fundamental constitutional
principle [is] that our people, adequately informed, may be trusted to
distinguish between the true and the false . . . [and disclosure laws insure] that
hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the information
comes from a disinterested source.”); id. (holding that a federal source disclosure
law for agents of foreign countries “implements rather than detracts from the
prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment”); Majors v. Abell, 361
F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004) (presuming that disclosure of the entities behind
political ads will improve the information environment for citizens by providing
useful information).
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might well differ depending on whether it was circulated by
Ralph Nader, Jerry Falwell, or Lyndon Larouche . . . .114

Depending on the circumstances, knowing the name of a
speaker may not be enough. Audiences consider it relevant
that an advertiser paid for a review,115 and not just in the
U.S.; the European Commission recently took the position
that undisclosed sponsorship is unfair to consumers even if
the factual message conveyed is true.116 We generally
believe that having a material interest in some outcome
affects one’s position in advocating for that outcome.
Sponsorship disclosure, therefore, is a way of protecting
114. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 82
(1991). In large part because of the risks of retaliation against members of
unpopular political groups, Kreimer does not endorse this principle as sufficient
to justify all disclosures in the case of political speech. Kreimer does not address
commercial speech.
115. Cf. Malcolm A. Heinicke, A Political Reformer’s Guide to Mcintyre and
Source Disclosure Laws for Political Advertising, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133,
139 (1997) (“The 1994 battle over Proposition 188 in California provides a good
example of the need for source disclosure laws. Proposition 188 involved the
tobacco industry’s attempt to invalidate some of California’s anti-tobacco laws.
Knowing that it would have difficulty convincing the public to support its selfserving initiative, the industry disingenuously billed its measure as a tobacco
control effort. Once voters realized that the tobacco industry had sponsored the
initiative and its advertisements, however, the measure was doomed. Indeed,
California voters overwhelmingly defeated the measure. Had the tobacco
industry been able to remain anonymous (as it largely was during the signature
drive which successfully put the measure on the ballot), the measure would
likely have fared better. . . . [I]n discussing this article with a constitutional law
professor, I asked her how she had voted on Proposition 188. She answered that
she had voted against the tobacco industry after someone explained the measure
to her. In other words, even for world-class legal scholars, the source of a
campaign ad is a necessary tool for evaluation. Furthermore, not all voters have
access to cogent explanations, and thus, may rely even more on the identity of
the proponents and opponents of ballot measures for guidance.”) (footnotes
omitted).
116. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION/APPLICATION
DIRECTIVE 2005/29/EC ON UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 8, 31 (2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/Guidance_UCP_Directive_en.pdf
(explaining that commercial practices are misleading if they are untruthful in
any way or if, in their “overall presentation, [they] deceive[ ] or [are] likely to
deceive[ ] the average consumer, even if the information is factually correct”;
marketing would be “unfair” if, for example, cosmetic companies paid bloggers
to promote and advertise their products on a blog, unbeknownst to other users).
OF

2010]

ATTENTION MUST BE PAID

763

listeners’ autonomy against manipulation.117 As Eric
Goldman notes, consumers “routinely say that they want to
know when content is marketing.”118
This problem has been recognized in other areas of the
law, for example in the copyright case of Ty v. PIL, where
Ty required its licensees who produced collector’s guides to
its Beanie Babies to disclaim affiliation. Judge Posner
commented that this practice was misleading. Ty’s licensees
offered opinions about the value of Beanie Babies that were
more credible because they appeared—but were not in
fact—independent, thus allowing Ty to reap greater profits.
The law intervened by allowing others to produce
unauthorized guides, denying Ty control over the market it
had been distorting.119
117. See Kreimer, supra note 114, at 87 (“If anonymity can be invoked at will
by the speaker . . . the speaker may use anonymity strategically to induce the
listener to act in accord with the speaker’s will. Selective silence can
manipulate preferences as effectively as speech . . . .”). Kreimer finds this
insufficient to justify certain disclosures in the political arena, because the
messages that benefit from anonymity or nondisclosure are those from
culturally disfavored sources—politically unpopular groups like Communists—
making forced disclosure a tool that is easily misused for political ends. See id.
at 88. “The Surgeon General is unlikely to claim the benefits of anonymity,
although the CIA may do so. Popular speakers need no shelter.” Id. With respect
to “astroturfed” speech by marketers, this dynamic is not present. Though
consumers may be skeptical of ad claims, there is no reason to think that they
are biased against Coca-Cola or General Motors generally, or that these entities
are at risk of either governmental or popular oppression; they run plenty of ads,
but also want “user-generated” endorsements that seem independent. Cf. R.
George Wright, Free Speech and the Mandated Disclosure of Information, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 475, 491-92 (1991) (arguing that discriminatory effect is an
important consideration in evaluating claims that disclosure requirements are
illegitimate). Kreimer also argues that marketing is not as efficacious as we
once thought it was, so disclosure isn’t as necessary—our “media-saturated
electorate” won’t be “duped into self-destruction by nefarious forces hiding
behind ‘institutes’ or ‘coalitions.’” Kreimer, supra note 114, at 88. Again, his
concerns may be convincing with respect to political speech by misleadinglynamed institutes and coalitions, but the rise of social media has created a new
opportunity for exploitation of consumers’ belief in the credibility of other
consumers’ individual experiences.
118. Goldman, Coasean Marketing, supra note 5, at 1189.
119. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Ty doesn’t
like criticism, and so the copyright licenses that it grants to those publishers
whom it is willing to allow to publish Beanie Baby collectors’ guides reserve to it
the right to veto any text in the publishers’ guides. It also forbids its licensees to
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Just as disclosure has benefits, nondisclosure has costs.
Without some indication of the terms on which a “user” is
participating in a debate—as a fan, as a shill, or as some
combination—audiences may lose trust in the medium,
moving user reviews and blog posts from credible grassroots
judgments to unbelievable “astroturf.”120
Eric Goldman contests the policy basis for disclosure
requirements.121 One obvious risk is that overly complex
disclosure might contribute to information overload.122
However, it is not clear that “disclosure: I received a free
Playstation in return for this post” is too hard for consumers

reveal that they are licensees of Ty. Its standard licensing agreement requires
the licensee to print on the title page and back cover of its publication the
following misleading statement: ‘This publication is not sponsored or endorsed
by, or otherwise affiliated with Ty Inc. All Copyrights and Trademarks of Ty
Inc. are used by permission. All rights reserved.’”) (citations omitted).
120. See Akerlof, supra note 91; Schaefer, supra note 90, at E6; see also Ann
Bartow, Some Peer-to-Peer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-Produced Thoughts,
5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 449, 458 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM (2006)) (“Astroturf subverts an informal norm of the Internet and of
the blogosphere in particular, authenticity.”); Goodman, supra note 11, at 86-87
(arguing that stealth marketing causes epistemic harms to the quality of public
discourse and the integrity of public institutions, and that sponsorship
disclosure thus corrects market failures). Without disclosure requirements,
“[d]oubt that an editor has an authentic voice leads to an overgeneralization of
distrust as audiences come to believe that mediated speech is inauthentic or
untrue even when it is not.” Id.; Posting of John D. to Making Light,
http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/archives/ 007947.html#141279 (Sept. 2,
2006, 9:09) (“The killing aspect of astroturf is that it poisons the well of
discourse. Before this, you could at least have a degree of confidence that the
stupid was authentic stupid. I’m not sure if I can deal with sorting out the fake
stupid.”) (quoted in Bartow, supra, at 460)).
121. Eric Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing, 85 TEX. L.
REV. SEE ALSO 11, 13-14 (2006), available at http://www.texaslrev.com/
seealso/vol/85/responses/goldman (expressing skepticism that consumers will
evaluate disclosures in the ways policymakers hope); see also Omri Ben-Shahar,
Myths of Consumer Protection: Information, Litigation, and Access, Address for
the Ronald H. Coase Lecture in Law and Economics (Feb. 17, 2009) (video
available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/426) c. 17:55 (criticizing
disclosure requirements in general as unlikely to be understood or properly
evaluated).
122. Goldman, supra note 121, at 14. Disclosure requirements can arguably be
hard to implement, especially in a rapid-fire medium. See id. at 13-14.
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to process.123 Even the extremely short-form messages on
Twitter are getting by with “Ad:” or “Sponsored:” at the
beginning.124
Goldman further notes that consumers have trouble
distinguishing sponsored from organic search engine
results. Moreover, users sometimes seem to trust sponsored
search results more than organic results: “consumers
regularly rate the utility of paid Internet search results
(such as ‘sponsored links’) as equal to or better than unpaid
search results generated by the search engine’s algorithms.
In one survey, 75% of consumers felt this way.”125 At the
same time, the label “marketing” is a turnoff, leading
consumers to disregard content even when it might be
relevant to them had they encountered it without the label.
That is, consumers like paid results, but apparently they
like them more when they do not know or are not thinking
about the fact that they are paid. Thus, Goldman concludes,
disclosure may paradoxically end up with consumers getting
less of the information they want.126 Worse, the disclosure
123. Eric Goldman pointed out that each additional requirement adds
something for consumers to process, and given how little we know about what
goes on in consumers’ highly variable brains, there might well be people who are
distracted by this disclosure from other information they would prefer to have.
Goldman, supra note 121, at 14. This is certainly a possibility, but I believe it
comes down to a judgment about what people, reasoning before the fact, would
want to know about promotional messages. Not all matters of relevance can be
disclosed in every message, and no one is seriously proposing that such a regime
be tried. But the sponsorship of a message is relevant across a large number of
situations.
124. The FTC takes the position that if a particular format makes disclosure
impossible, the advertiser must avoid that format to prevent deception. There
are things one can and can’t articulate in 140 characters. If the message is so
incomplete that it becomes misleading when it’s that compressed, then Twitter
isn’t an appropriate ad medium for that message. Caroline McCarthy, Yes, New
FTC Guidelines Extend to Facebook Fan Pages, CNET NEWS, Oct. 5, 2009,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10368064-36.html?tag=mncol;mlt_related
(“‘There are ways to abbreviate a disclosure that fit within 140 characters,’ [the
associate director of the FTC’s advertising division] said. ‘You may have to say a
little bit of something else, but if you can’t make the disclosure, you can’t make
the ad.’”). As long as it is constitutional to ban misleading commercial speech,
the FTC’s conclusion seems unobjectionable.
125. Goldman, supra note 121, at 12 (footnotes omitted).
126. See id. at 13 (“The ‘advertising’ label is a powerful disclosure; it can
single-handedly cause consumers to overlook content they would have otherwise
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requirements may convince consumers that the relationship
between the advertiser and the speaker matters, when they
might not otherwise care.127
Judges have expressed this overdeterrence concern in
other circumstances, suggesting that disclosure interferes
with an audience’s ability to evaluate a claim on its own
merits.128 The legal argument, however, is generally tied to
anonymity rather than failure to disclose a connection. The
reasoning continues that readers are able to factor in
anonymity (or pseudonymity) as part of their overall
evaluation of the message’s credibility. But by definition,
readers can’t factor in an undisclosed connection. At most,
they can discount all claims because of the possibility of an
undisclosed connection with the advertiser, which brings us
back to the classic problem of the market for lemons:
information generally becomes unreliable, as consumers
discount independent information too much and sponsored
found meritorious. A 2005 study . . . illustrates this risk. Consumers were shown
multiple sets of Internet search results, some of which were labeled advertising.
Although the search results substantively were the same, consumers rated the
unlabeled search results as more relevant than the labeled results. In other
words, the advertising label single-handedly degraded the consumers’ relevancy
assessment even though the search results had the same level of relevancy.”)
(footnotes omitted); see also Feldman, supra note 81, at 3 (“[T]he FTC has
infused confusion into the marketplace and will undoubtedly encourage
disclosure of ‘material terms’ that are probably more likely to confuse consumers
than help them.”).
127. See Goldman, supra note 121, at 14-15 (“By mandating sponsorship
disclosures, the government communicates to consumers that they should care
about the distinctions between editorial and marketing content. . . . When the
government makes disclosures louder, it may simply be ratcheting up the
communicative import of the message, heightening consumer sensitivity to the
sponsorship disclosure and magnifying the risk of erroneous consumer reactions
to the disclosure.”).
128. See Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 357 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring dubitante) (“[W]e must consider the possibility that anonymity
promotes a focus on the strength of the argument rather than the identity of the
speaker; this is a reason why Madison, Hamilton, and Jay chose to publish The
Federalist anonymously. Instead of having to persuade New Yorkers that his
roots in Virginia should be overlooked, Madison could present the arguments
and let the reader evaluate them on merit.”); ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d
979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[F]ar from enhancing the reader’s evaluation of a
message, identifying the publisher can interfere with that evaluation by
requiring the introduction of potentially extraneous information at the very
time the reader encounters the substance of the message.”).
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information too little. Ultimately, anonymity and
pseudonymity
are
distinguishable
from
the
misrepresentation that accompanies puppetry.129
In light of consumers’ discounting for uncertainty, the
studies on which Goldman relies can be read multiple ways.
In the one he cites most heavily, for example, there was a
ten percent gap in perceived relevancy of the same result
depending on whether it was presented to respondents as
paid or organic, but that might simply reflect a useful
heuristic, especially as searchers were generally able to find
relevant results in the organic list.130 At the very least, the
129. The Supreme Court has generally considered anonymity and
pseudonymity the same for constitutional purposes. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995) (equating anonymous speech with
“authors writing under assumed names”). In McIntyre, the pseudonym used was
arguably misleading, in that it claimed to speak for a group of citizens
(“CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS”) but was in fact produced only
by one individual. See id. at 337. The Supreme Court nonetheless found that the
First Amendment still barred a law requiring the individual to disclose her
identity in order to engage in political speech. But a law targeted at
impersonation would be quite different than that at stake in McIntyre. It seems
likely that a law targeted at commercial sock-puppetry—borrowing a different
consumer identity in order to avoid the credibility deficits of the commercial
speaker’s real identity—would at least warrant more judicial deference. See
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 354 n. 18 (distinguishing McIntyre’s independent
individual speech from corporate speech on the ground that identification of the
source of corporate advertising “.) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 792 n.32 (1978)); cf. VILI LEHDONVIRTA, TURKU SCHOOL OF ECON., VIRTUAL
CONSUMPTION
45
(2009),
http://info.tse.fi/julkaisut/vk/Ae11_2009.pdf
(summarizing work on effects of pseudonymity); Kumayama, supra note 71, at
444 (“With a name comes the ability to accrue reputational capital. This permits
the actor to receive the same protections afforded by anonymity, but with the
additional benefits that come with reputation—most notably, the ability to form
enduring relationships.”) (footnotes omitted). If the Supreme Court adheres to
this position, McIntyre is thus unlikely to pose a barrier to commercial
disclosure requirements. See Meredith Hattendorf, Theoretical Splits and
Consistent Results on Anonymous Political Speech: Majors v. Abell and ACLU of
Nev. v. Heller, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 925, 933-34 (2006).
130. See Bernard J. Jansen & Marc Resnick, Pa. State Univ., Examining
Searcher Perceptions of and Interactions with Sponsored Results 4 (2005),
http://www.ist.psu.edu/faculty_pages/jjansen/academic/pubs/jansen_ecommerce_
workshop.pdf (“[P]articipants rated 52% of the organic listings as relevant
compared to only 42% of the sponsored listings.”). Participants rated pages they
had accessed via “sponsored”-labeled links as about equally relevant to pages
accessed via “organic”-labeled links, but because what was presented as
“organic” and what was presented as “sponsored” had been manipulated, it is
not clear how to interpret this finding: that is, they might have perceived

768

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

survey authors’ conclusion that search engine advertising
won’t be a viable business without changes in consumer
attitudes131 is a little odd, given that search engine
advertising is practically the only profitable business model
on the Web. More generally, outcomes in search engine
studies suggest that labeled, sponsored ads can be quite
useful to consumers. The label “paid” is not a major
deterrent to following links, even if (or perhaps because)
consumers apply a credibility discount to ads compared to
organic results.132 Thus, disclosure seems unlikely to
hamper welfare-enhancing uses of ads.
What consumers hate even more than marketing,
though, is late-discovered marketing: “Search engines that
were less transparent about paid search results lost
credibility. . . .”133 This last result supports the market-forlemons concern: consumers dislike stealth marketing
enough to punish its (suspected or discovered) purveyors.
We return to the point that the alternative to labeling rules
is pervasive uncertainty.
The negative consequences of nondisclosure for the
trustworthy flow of information can also be seen by
examining the flipside: the legal status of non-sponsored
references and reviews. An unregulated regime would risk
expanding trademark law even further to control expression
about trademarked goods and services. If consumers must
equality because, half the sponsored results having been relabeled as organic
and vice versa, the relevance was equal. See id. at 5, figs. 3 & 4.
131. See Margaret Hopkins & Charles DuBois, Consumers Suspicious of
Sponsored Links, PA. STATE LIVE, June 8, 2005, http://live.psu.edu/story/12348.
132. See Sha Yang & Anindya Ghose, Analyzing the Relationship Between
Organic and Sponsored Search Advertising: Positive, Negative or Zero
Interdependence?
3
(2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491315. It appears that firms do best when their
results appear as both organic and sponsored. See id. (manuscript at 4-5).
Perhaps consumers use sponsored and organic results as relevancy checks on
each other. See id. (manuscript at 25); see generally ICROSSING, SEARCH
SYNERGY: NATURAL & PAID SEARCH SYMBIOSIS 3,5 (Mar. 1, 2007),
http://www.icrossing.com/research/icrossing-search-synergy-report.php
(reporting that organic and paid results synergistically reinforce one another);
IPROSPECT, SEARCH ENGINE USER ATTITUDES 15-16 (Apr.-May 2004),
http://www.iprospect.com/premiumPDFs/iProspectSurveyComplete.pdf
(consumers tend to prefer organic results, but they also make significant use of
sponsored results).
133. Jansen & Resnick, supra note 130, at 2.
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expect an association between a trademark owner and a
person who reviews that product (or even just when the
review is positive), then trademark owners can argue
actionable confusion when reviews are not to their taste.
There are many plausible scenarios in which a rational
trademark owner would object to a review, even one that
wasn’t a vicious attack: positive but profane, racist, or
otherwise untoward reviews; mixed reviews; or reviews
appearing alongside content of which the trademark owner
does not approve. If the law holds that consumers must
reasonably expect anyone’s message to be associated with
an undisclosed sponsor, then trademark owners will have
firmer ground to make these extremely broad and speechsuppressive claims.134
Setting this problem aside, we are left with the difficult
question of whether (possibly unwarranted) discounting of a
sponsored message is better than (possibly unwarranted)
credence given to an apparently unsponsored message. The
real problem is that the very ideology of consumer
competence which prompts calls for limiting the
government’s power to regulate commercial speech is
inconsistent with the pragmatic objection to disclosure: if
consumers discount information once they know it is
marketing, perhaps they were overvaluing it—using their
own valuation schemes—beforehand. If the state can’t ban
true information just because people might be convinced by
it, then private parties also shouldn’t be able to conceal true
information just because people might be convinced by it.135
As a doctrinal matter, even in the context of political
speech, courts have not required empirical evidence that
identity disclosure improves decisionmaking. They have
allowed regulators to rely on the strong intuition that such
information is useful to citizens.136 In essence, given that

134. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 54, at 414-15, 428, 444-45 (describing
similar assertions and arguing that they should be rejected).
135. There is little reason to think that the market will provide the optimal
level of disclosure, especially since efficient market theory itself assumes perfect
information, and collapses in tangles when information is instead assessed as a
cost. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 35-41 (1996).
136. See, e.g., Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)informed Electorate: Insights
into the Supreme Court’s Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 225,
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information regularly changes our preferences, a disclosure
requirement is a precommitment to caring about source and
sponsorship. It expresses a metapreference about how we
want to make decisions and weigh information. This sort of
precommitment strategy is a classic use of government to,
in essence, tie ourselves to the mast.137 The widespread and
intense hatred for intrusive and undisclosed marketing,
which Goldman catalogs,138 is evidence that we consumers,
acting as citizens, want to affect our own future decisions by
providing ourselves with certain information that we might
not otherwise have at the time we’re being sold a particular
product. No matter how seductive a particular pitch sounds
when we hear it, and no matter how much we would want to
believe, after we were convinced by it, that we would have
been equally convinced had we known the pitch was
sponsored, we want to avoid that situation. We want to be
reminded that we’re being approached for commercial gain
at the time of the approach, so we can remember the
reasons that we distrust ads in general.139
251, 274, 289 (2003) (recognizing, though criticizing, this absence of empirical
underpinning).
137. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, Ethics, Law,
and the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 96-112
(1984) (examining legal frameworks for precommitment); Steven Ratner,
Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX.
L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2003) (“The theory of precommitment offers a framework for
understanding the reasons that, and the methods by which, individuals and
communities seek to bind themselves in the sense of preventing themselves
from having full liberty of action at a time in the future.”); David L. Shapiro,
Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 522-25 (1988)
(defending precommitment as an acceptable kind of self-paternalism).
138. Coasean Marketing, supra note 5, at 1152-54.
139. This argument does have perhaps disturbing scope. It could, for example,
be used to justify disclosure of attempts to buy popularity, such as paying
consumers to watch videos so that they’ll make the list of “most watched,” link
farming to improve a website’s position in search results, or buying books in
bulk to help propel them to the top of best-seller lists. Most attempts to buy
popularity—massive advertising campaigns—are self-evidently massive
advertising campaigns and need no further disclosure. Nonetheless, if it
becomes common to attempt to buy popularity in some other misleading way,
and if self-defense by ranking entities fails (since Google, the New York Times,
and other reporters on popularity generally try to filter out such manipulations),
additional disclosure requirements could well be justified.
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Goldman’s policy argument nonetheless has a
constitutional dimension. In Riley v. National Federation of
the Blind,140 the Supreme Court held that mandatory
disclosure by fundraisers of the percentage of donated
dollars spent on fundraising was an undue burden, in part
because it might be misleading.141 People might not
understand that a high fundraising cost for a small charity
with limited appeal could be perfectly consistent with a true
charitable purpose and function; they might hang up on the
fundraiser as soon as they heard the high percentage of
receipts retained by the fundraiser.142 Notably, the Supreme
Court in Riley hypothesized that donors would be deterred
from contributing by the disclosures, but did not have
evidence of this.143
Riley’s concern for disclosures that are in themselves
misleading is a difficult argument for the regulatory
position. Rather than positing careful and linguistically
competent listeners, this criticism of disclosure engages
with deceptiveness theory on its own terms, asking how
140. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
141. The Court did not use the term “misleading,” but in presuming that
disclosure would be “unfavorable,” id. at 799, it recalled its earlier discussion of
valid reasons for devoting a high percentage of revenues to fundraising—if the
cause is unpopular or the charity’s efforts involve education of listeners about
the charity’s issue as part of fundraising appeals. See id. at 793-94.
142. Id. at 799-800 (“[C]ompelled disclosure will almost certainly hamper the
legitimate efforts of professional fundraisers to raise money for the charities
they represent. First, this provision necessarily discriminates against small or
unpopular charities, which must usually rely on professional fundraisers.
Campaigns with high costs and expenses carried out by professional fundraisers
must make unfavorable disclosures, with the predictable result that such
solicitations will prove unsuccessful. . . . Second, in the context of a verbal
solicitation, if the potential donor is unhappy with the disclosed percentage, the
fundraiser will not likely be given a chance to explain the figure; the disclosure
will be the last words spoken as the donor closes the door or hangs up the
phone.”). But see id. at 811 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me that
even in cases where the solicitation involves dissemination of a ‘message’ by the
charity (through the fundraiser), the disclosure required by the statute at issue
here will have little, if any, effect on the message itself, though it may have an
effect on the potential donor’s desire to contribute financially to the cause.”).
143. See id. at 811-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); cf. Wright, supra note 117,
at 476, 484 (suggesting that Riley is, at base, about the clash of two views of a
well-functioning marketplace, one of which requires some government
intervention to facilitate informed transactions and the other which trusts the
market over government).
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truthful (but arguably incomplete) information is actually
processed by consumers.144 In other words, the concern for
misapprehension might fairly be described as a
paternalistic concern: people will receive truthful
information and not know what to do with it.145 If the
disclosure distorts consumers’ decisions more than
nondisclosure does, then Riley suggests a First Amendment
problem.
Because Riley involved noncommercial speech and the
Court was careful to limit its holding to such speech,146 the
appropriate doctrinal answer might be that courts should
defer to the FTC’s judgment that particular commercial
144. See generally Kreimer, supra note 114, at 79-82 (exploring the tension
between the utility of disclosure to listeners and its ability to divert them from
the speaker’s message); Tushnet, supra note 100, at 237, 250-51 (canvassing
situations in which disclosure of truthful information might change preferences
and/or generate further factual inferences about the meaning of the disclosed
information); cf. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798 (“[W]e would not immunize a law
requiring a speaker favoring a particular government project to state at the
outset of every address the average cost overruns in similar projects, or a law
requiring a speaker favoring an incumbent candidate to state during every
solicitation that candidate’s recent travel budget. Although the foregoing factual
information might be relevant to the listener, and, in the latter case, could
encourage or discourage the listener from making a political donation, a law
compelling its disclosure would clearly and substantially burden the protected
speech.”).
145. Cf. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (“There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself
harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them.”). Courts have since disfavored
regulations that restrict information based on similar fears of how people will
react to the message. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,789-92 (1978)
(“[Citizens] are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the
relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate. But if there be any danger
that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced[,] . . .
it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment.”) (footnote
omitted); Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280, 283 (9th Cir. 1990) (invalidating on
First Amendment grounds regulations that prevented political parties from
telling voters which nonpartisan candidates the parties supported), vacated as
moot, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
146. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 & n.9 (explicitly distinguishing securities disclosure
requirements because securities law regulates commercial speech); cf. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1994) (governing disclosure).
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speech is misleading. Other accepted legal regimes are also
relevant, such as informed consent requirements.
Legislatures and courts applying common law can require
doctors and other professionals to disclose information
because they conclude that patients and clients are entitled
to additional information and may make better choices with
it.147 Likewise, pharmaceutical companies are required to
disclose drug side effects; clothes merchants are required to
disclose the composition of the fabric they sell;
manufacturers generally are required to disclose the
country of origin of their goods; and so on.148 Turning these
assessments into battles of the experts, such that mistakes
about the net utility of the required information would
result in First Amendment violations, would be a major,
and unwarranted, change in constitutional law. The core
issue is whether the government is allowed to find facts
about deceptiveness. If it can (as would be required even for
a basic ban on fraud), then its determinations, if made in
procedurally reliable ways, deserve judicial deference.
The issue of who decides what’s deceptive may explain
why Riley was, from inception, sharply limited in its
holding. Riley specifically stated that an identity disclosure
147. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis
of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 968-72, 978-80 (2007)
(“The state can require doctors to disclose accurate information, and it can
equally prohibit doctors from providing misleading information.”).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1305-07 (D.
Utah 2003) (upholding compelled disclosure under securities laws).
“[S]upporting this conclusion are the wealth of federal and state regulatory
programs which require disclosure of product or other commercial information,”
including tobacco labeling, nutritional labeling, disclosures in prescription drug
advertisements, disclosures of workplace hazards, and mandatory labeling of
light bulbs to indicate if they contain mercury. Id. at 1307 (footnotes omitted);
see also SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(“In areas of extensive federal regulation—like securities dealing—we do not
believe the Constitution requires the judiciary to weigh the relative merits of
particular regulatory objectives that impinge upon communications occurring
within the umbrella of an overall regulatory scheme. We note, however, that
even if we were so required, disclosure requirements have been upheld in
regulation of commercial speech even when the government has not shown that
‘absent the required disclosure, [the speech would be false or deceptive] or that
the disclosure requirement serves some substantial government interest other
than preventing deception’ . . . Stock Market Magazine’s failure to disclose
consideration received in return for publication is then, in principle,
constitutionally proscribable.”); Tushnet, supra note 100, at 249-50 & n.104.
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requirement—including a requirement that the fundraiser
disclose his or her professional, which is to say paid,
status—was constitutional notwithstanding that the law
regulated fully protected noncommercial speech.149 This
seems quite similar to the disclosure requirement as stated
by the FTC. The policy basis for disclosure is generally
contestable, but given the demonstrated relevance of source
to evaluations of information’s credibility, source disclosure
should be constitutionally permissible even if other
mandatory disclosures would require more evidence on the
state’s part.150
This conclusion returns us to the idea of
precommitment. Sponsorship disclosure can affect
decisionmaking, in that a person who hears “this is an ad”
may well discount the underlying claim more than she
would have in the absence of the disclosure. But she is also
likely to express a metapreference for knowing when she’s
hearing ads. This preference puts source disclosure in a
somewhat better position, even from an anti-paternalistic
standpoint, than certain other types of disclosure, as to
which consumers are likely to have much less well-formed
desires for precommitment (e.g., it is unlikely that
consumers give much thought to the appropriate amount
they want charities to spend on fundraising).
4. Endorsements as Facts. A final matter of significant
theoretical interest is the question of what, exactly, is false
or misleading about undisclosed endorsement relationships.
In the U.S., the law has rarely attempted to regulate
“image” advertising—advertising that does not make factual
representations but attempts to create a “warm fuzzy glow”
149. Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11 (“[N]othing in this opinion should be taken to
suggest that the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously
his or her professional status. On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored
requirement would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.”); cf. Leslie G.
Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed
Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 627-29 (1991) (arguing that allowing
mandated disclosure of professional fundraising status is not consistent with the
Court’s own reasoning rejecting mandated disclosure of percentage of money
spent on fundraising; both will have similar effects on targets’ decisionmaking
and thus on charities).
150. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) (“The
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of
the justification raised.”).
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or other feeling about a product or service.151 From a classic
commercial speech perspective, regulation of image ads
would be difficult to justify because such ads are not
falsifiable.152 In false advertising doctrine, such claims are
considered nonactionable puffery on which no reasonable
consumer would rely.153 The law has, in other words,
equated nonfalsifiability with unreliability, and irrebuttably
presumed that consumers do not rely on that which is
objectively unreliable.
But what about an endorser paid to puff? The
regulatory theory is that an undisclosed sponsorship
relationship could distort consumer decisionmaking. Yet
151. Aside from initiatives to suppress cigarette marketing, the major
exception might be dilution law, which regulates the creation of negative
emotions about others’ brands. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 522-24, 551-52.
152. Goodman, supra note 55, at 693; Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise
Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 119-21 & n.442-44 (1999)
(“While the propositions that ‘America is turning 7-Up’ and that Burger King
sells tastier hamburgers than McDonalds may elude scientific determination,
presumably the television commercials containing these claims have not been
the target of official censorship. And even if the FCC were to descend on
sponsors or broadcasters of these sorts of boasts, it is difficult to construct a
rationale that would sustain this suppression under current commercial speech
doctrine.”) (footnotes omitted).
153. “There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and
if he does he suffers from his [own] credulity.” Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons
Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918) (Hand, J.); see also Pizza Hut, Inc. v.
Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[N]on-actionable
‘puffery’ comes in at least two possible forms: (1) an exaggerated, blustering,
and boasting statement upon which no reasonable buyer would be justified in
relying; or (2) a general claim of superiority over comparable products that is so
vague that it can be understood as nothing more than a mere expression of
opinion.”); In re General Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Prods. Liab. Litig., 966
F. Supp. 1525, 1531 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (plaintiffs alleged they had detrimentally
relied on claims that anti-lock brakes were 99% more effective, and 100 times
more likely to benefit drivers, than air bags, but such claims were puffery
because consumers could not reasonably believe that there was a test
supporting them), aff’d, 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999); Tylka v. Gerber Prods. Co.,
No. 96 C 1647, 1999 WL 495126, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1999) (nutrition claims
“add[ed] little to the daily informational barrage to which consumers are
exposed,” and a reasonable consumer should have seen that they were
meaningless sales patter); Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 946 F.
Supp. 115, 130 (D. Mass. 1996) (explaining the concept of puffery); Avon Prods.
Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Off!
Skintastic is just a hundred times better!” was too exaggerated to be believed
and, therefore, puffery).
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how could there be material deception if the endorser’s
positive but detail-free message was puffery? The
endorsement guidelines implicitly recognize that, as
advertising scholars have long maintained, image ads do
affect consumer decisions—puffery works, which is why
advertisers use it.154 Nonetheless, in the U.S., we usually do
not try to regulate puffery because of the falsifiability
problem. It is only when there is an undisclosed financial
relationship that we can identify a specific element of the
message that’s deceptive.155
It is still important to recognize that in an undisclosed
sponsorship case where the speaker simply puffs, the
deception can only be material if vague, fact-free claims
made by a sufficiently credible source affect purchase
decisions.156 And, it should be emphasized, this paradox of
material puffery is equally true in traditional ads, where
the FTC has long required disclosure by endorsers where
the endorsement relationship is not clear from context,
regardless of whether an ad makes falsifiable factual
claims.157

154. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657,
662 (1985); Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other “Loophole” Claims: How the
Law’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity In Advertising,
18 J.L. & COM. 49, 80-98 (1998).
155. Cf. SEC v. Curshen, Fed. Sec. & L. Rep. (BNA) ¶ 95,718, 2010 WL
1444910, at *6 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing that vague optimistic predictions
from someone known to be associated with the company don’t violate the
securities laws because they are easily understood as self-interested puffery,
and holding that the court did not need to reach the question of whether the
same statements would be nonactionable puffery if consumers weren’t aware of
the self-interested nature of such positive statements).
156. Cf. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Maclean Hunter Publ’g Corp., 457 N.E.2d
480, 487 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983) (“‘[I]t is true that a bare and naked statement as to
value is ordinarily deemed the opinion of the party making the representation . .
. [but] such statement may be a positive affirmation of a fact, intended as such
by the party making it, and reasonably regarded as such by the party to whom it
is made. When it is such, it is like any other representation of fact . . . .”)
(citations omitted). But see Goodman, supra note 55, at 704-05 (arguing that
regulation of undisclosed sponsorship may not be justified if the claims are
immaterial to consumers).
157. See Disclosure of Material Connections, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (“When there
exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of the advertised
product which might materially affect the weight or credibility of the
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The cool kid who tells her friends that a product is
really awesome can get them to buy it. The cool kid’s
endorsement might even be performative, in that the
endorsement makes the product cool. This is related to the
problem of the placebo effect, where claiming that a product
produces certain effects leads consumers to believe in (and
even experience) those effects. The law has had little trouble
finding that products that only work because of the placebo
effect are falsely advertised.158 Regardless of how coolness is
produced, it matters whether the cool kid is telling her
friends voluntarily or for pay. This conclusion requires us to
take even nonfalsifiable claims seriously as claims that can
distort a consumer’s decisions.
C. Statutory Interpretation: Does Section 230 Invalidate the
FTC’s Guidance?
Assuming that all these conceptual issues can, as I have
argued, be resolved in favor of requiring disclosure and
substantiation, section 230 appears again as a potential
statutory barrier. Eric Goldman argued that the FTC’s new
guidelines clearly targeted specific business models such as
that of PayPerPost, which offers advertisers and bloggers
pretty much what its name promises: matching, for pay,
endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the audience)
such connection must be fully disclosed.”).
158. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. QT, Inc. 512 F.3d 858, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“[T]he Federal Trade Commission Act condemns material falsehoods in
promoting consumer products; the statute lacks an exception for ‘beneficial
deceit.’ . . . [T]he placebo effect cannot justify fraud in promoting a product.”);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[A]llowing advertisers to rely on the placebo effect would not only harm those
individuals who were deceived; it would create a substantial economic cost as
well, by allowing sellers to fleece large numbers of consumers who, unable to
evaluate the efficacy of an inherently useless product, make repeat purchases of
that product.”); United States v. An Article . . . Acu-Dot . . ., 483 F. Supp. 1311,
1315 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (claims of efficacy from placebo effect are “‘misleading’
because the [product] is not inherently effective, its results being attributable to
the psychosomatic effect produced by the advertising and marketing of the
[product]”); In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 336 (1983) (“‘The Commission
cannot accept as proof of a product’s efficacy a psychological reaction stemming
from a belief which, to a substantial degree, was caused by respondent’s
deceptions. Indeed, were we to hold otherwise, advertisers would be encouraged
to foist unsubstantiated claims on an unsuspecting public in the hope that
consumers would believe the ads and the claims would be self-fulfilling.”)
(citation omitted).
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those who have products to tout with those who’d like to be
paid for touting them.159 The FTC used the following
example:
A skin care products advertiser participates in a blog
advertising service. The service matches up advertisers with
bloggers who will promote the advertiser’s products on their
personal blogs. The advertiser requests that a blogger try a
new body lotion and write a review of the product on her blog.
Although the advertiser does not make any specific claims
about the lotion’s ability to cure skin conditions and the
blogger does not ask the advertiser whether there is
substantiation for the claim, in her review the blogger writes
that the lotion cures eczema and recommends the product to
her blog readers who suffer from this condition. The advertiser
is subject to liability for misleading or unsubstantiated
representations made through the blogger’s endorsement.160

The advertiser’s responsibilities are a bit different from
those it bears in conventional advertising, where the
advertiser generally can exercise direct control over the
content of the ad.161 To avoid liability, it must provide
proper direction to endorsers on making clear and
conspicuous disclosures about compensation and on
avoiding misleading or unsubstantiated representations.
And, if the blogger nonetheless makes misleading or
unsubstantiated representations, the advertiser has to take
reasonable steps to correct them. The advertiser should
monitor the results of its promotional schemes (as one
would hope it would monitor any advertising carried out on
its behalf) and take reasonable steps to ensure that the
guidelines are being followed.162 If the blogger refuses to
159. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/10/do_the_ftcs_new.htm (Oct. 6, 2009,
10:04).
160. FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,139 (emphasis added).
161. This is unsurprising; different forms of advertising have always been
assessed based on advertiser control. Thus, while an advertiser may be required
to stop an ongoing ad campaign on television, the FTC does not, so far as I am
aware, order an advertiser to retrieve disseminated copies of a magazine to
remove a misleading ad. In the Internet context, control simply plays out in
different ways.
162. See FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 73, at 53,139 (“In order to limit
its potential liability, the advertiser should ensure that the advertising service
provides guidance and training to its bloggers concerning the need to ensure
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disclose sponsorship, or to correct unsubstantiated or
misleading statements, then the advertiser should sever
relations with the blogger and not provide further
compensation.163
But does section 230 cover these promotional
relationships, making this careful regulatory scheme
impossible? Recall section 230’s mandates that “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”164 Eric
Goldman argued that, when PayPerPost makes a match
with a blogger, “[t]here is no employment or agency
relationship between the advertiser or the blogger; this is
an ordinary customer-vendor relationship, mediated by
PayPerPost.”165 If, without the advertiser’s further input,
the blogger then made a truthful166 statement about her
experience with the product that would be impermissible if
made by the advertiser, the FTC might still hold the
advertiser responsible for the statement. This, he continued,
was a classic section 230 situation: “the advertiser is the
user of an interactive computer service, the blog post is
content provided by another information content provider,
and the FTC’s theory that the advertiser adopts or endorses
the blog post treats the advertiser as the publisher or
speaker of the third party blogger’s blog post.”167
The key point here is that the advertiser must be a
“user” of an interactive computer service to qualify for
section 230 protection, and Goldman offered two arguments
for why this is so: “First, PayPerPost provides an interactive
computer service, and the advertiser uses PayPerPost.
that statements they make are truthful and substantiated. The advertiser
should also monitor bloggers who are being paid to promote its products and
take steps necessary to halt the continued publication of deceptive
representations when they are discovered.”).
163. See id. at 53,135-36.
164. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (emphasis added).
165. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/10/ a_fuller_defens.htm (Oct. 12, 2009,
11:55).
166. In fact, under Goldman’s theory, even if the blogger deliberately lied
about her experience, the advertiser would not be liable.
167. Goldman, supra note 165.
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Second, the advertiser is a ‘user’ of some Internet
connectivity provider just by getting online.”168 He admitted
that his second theory was “perhaps disconcertingly”
expansive: anyone online is entitled to section 230
immunity.169 On this theory, for example, a newspaper
would no longer be liable for the defamatory statements of
its reporters, at least if the newspaper publishes online.
Still, Goldman defended his result as consistent with
section 230’s broad scope: “unless the plaintiff’s claim fits
into one of the statutory exclusions[,] . . . A isn’t liable for
third party B’s online content or actions. Period.”170 If A is
the advertiser and B is the blogger, A simply can’t be liable
for B’s posts.
In fact, Goldman’s logic goes further than that: Section
230 states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”171 The statute does not by its terms
specify that the “information” provided by the content
provider has to be provided online, or in its role as online
information content provider, in order for immunity to
attach. Barnes & Noble has a website and is therefore a
provider of an interactive computer service. If we are
determined to read section 230 expansively, Barnes & Noble
should be immune from liability for defamatory content in a
book it sold in its physical stores, because the book’s
publisher would be another information content provider. In
addition, it should be immune if it contracted to distribute
the book via email, thus making its use of the Internet a
but-for cause of the harm, even if Barnes & Noble knew
about the defamatory content and otherwise satisfied the
conditions for defamation liability for a distributor.
Because Goldman identifies section 230 as an Internet
exceptionalist statute,172 he would likely not endorse the
168. Id.
169. Id. Goldman contended that the leading section 230 cases treat “user”
just this expansively. See id. (citing Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal.
2006)).
170. Goldman, supra note 165.
171. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
172. Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm (Apr. 3,
2008, 8:05).
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offline reading. Furthermore, courts have required that the
information at issue be provided to an online service
provider in its role as online service provider.173 But if we
imply a requirement that the information at issue must be
provided online for the immunity to attach, it is not clear
why we cannot impose liability based on offline/noninformation-based elements of a relationship.
So what about A’s payment to B? Goldman argued that
this was irrelevant. He pointed out that in the early case of
Blumenthal v. Drudge,174 AOL won a section 230 defense
against liability for Matt Drudge’s allegedly defamatory
content, even though AOL both paid Drudge to produce
content and retained editorial control over that content.175
Nor, Goldman argued, did the payment in the PayPerPost
example create a respondeat superior or employer-employee
relationship between the parties176 (apparently conceding
173. See, for example, Batzel v. Smith, where the court explained:
[Section 230] is concerned with providing special immunity for
individuals who would otherwise be publishers or speakers, because of
Congress’s concern with assuring a free market in ideas and information
on the Internet. If information is provided to those individuals in a
capacity unrelated to their function as a provider or user of interactive
computer services, then there is no reason to protect them with the
special statutory immunity.
333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. Avery v. Idleaire Techs. Corp., No. 3:04CV-312, 2007 WL 1574269, at *20 (E.D. Tenn. May 29, 2007) (rejecting a section
230 defense that an employer was not responsible for the creation of a hostile
work environment based in part on the presence in the workplace of
pornography downloaded from the Internet by employees). The Avery court did
not explain its reasoning, but the intuition that the harassment was unrelated
to the employer’s role as Internet user may have been a part of its conclusion.
174. 992 F. Supp. 44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998).
175. Goldman, supra note 165.
176. Goldman stated:
I don’t think the example indicates an agency relationship because the
advertiser lacks the requisite control over the blogger. PayPerPost’s
mediation of the advertiser-blogger relationship further reinforces the
lack of agency; indeed, the advertiser may not even be communicating
directly with the blogger. And even if the blogger were the advertiser’s
employee or agent, 230 still might apply for the blogger’s statements that
exceed the advertiser’s authorization.
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that section 230 would not protect an online newspaper
against defamation based on its employee-reporters’
statements).177 Unlike Quiznos, with its user-generated
advertising, the skin cream maker in the FTC’s example
“never republished the blog post or even signaled any
adoption of or agreement with the post.” Given the
“tenuous” relationship between the advertiser and the
blogger, he concluded, the FTC was simply overreaching.178
I think Goldman reads “user” too broadly in either
version of his argument.179 A more natural reading of the
function of the term “user” in the statute is that a Blogspot
blogger is a user of Google’s services, and is not responsible
for content in his comments section, which is provided by
other users of Google’s services. In the PayPerPost case, the
advertiser is not a “user” in the conventional sense of
Id. (citing Delfino v. Agilent Techs., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 397-99 (Ct. App. 2006)
and Higher Balance, LLC v. Quantum Future Group, Inc., No. 08-233-HA, 2008
WL 5281487, at 6*-7* (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2008)).
177. Paul Alan Levy made the following criticism of Professor Goldman:
[Goldman] implicitly acknowledges that if the blogger were actually the
in-house employee of the advertiser, action could be taken against the
advertiser under the doctrine of respondeat superior, so long as the blog
post was written within the scope of the blogger’s employment. That is
what the court said in the Delfino case that Professor Goldman mentions,
although the court found that the posts in question there were outside the
scope of employment.
Posting of Paul Alan Levy to CL&P Blog, http://pubcit.typepad.com/
clpblog/2009/10/do-the-ftcs-new-advertising-guidelines-run-afoul-of-section
230.html (Oct. 16, 2009, 14:20 PST) (citation omitted).
178. Goldman, supra note 165. See also Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology
and
Marketing
Law
Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/
10/craigslist_isnt.htm (Oct. 21, 2009, 13:13 PST), where Goldman argues that a
recent case involving Craigslist supports his interpretation. But the court in
that case actually found that Craigslist did not create the unlawful content at
issue, and thus could not be treated as the speaker. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc.,
No. 09 C 1385, 2009 WL 3416106, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009). It did not hold
that Craigslist or any other entity could escape derivative liability regardless of
the relationship between itself and another party posting content.
179. See also Levy, supra note 177 (“Professor Goldman has not taken
adequate account of the fact that the FTC is regulating the advertiser, not in its
capacity as the provider or user of an interactive computer service, but in its
capacity as the employer (in a larger sense) of the blogger.”).
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providing content via the service provider.180 In fact, the
blogger does not “use” PayPerPost to post content either.
Money, not content, flows through PayPerPost, even if it
operates over the Internet and even if it relies on content
posted on the Internet to determine when to pay that
money.
Section 230, as an Internet exceptionalist statute,
prevents treating Internet service providers as publishers,
and even as distributors. Quiznos, when it hosted the
allegedly false user-generated ads over which Subway sued,
was acting as a service provider. Section 230 should have
precluded liability, even though Quiznos suggested topics
for submitted content, just as moderators of discussion
boards do.181 Likewise, I am persuaded by Goldman’s
argument that the Securities & Exchange Commission is
barred by section 230 from treating misstatements to which
a company links on the Internet as the company’s own
misstatements for purposes of enforcing the securities
laws.182
180. Section 230’s use of the term “provided” reinforces this interpretation;
section 230 is not aimed at protecting parties to whom content is not provided.
Compare Batzel v. Smith, where the court explained:
“[P]rovided” suggests, at least, some active role by the “provider” in
supplying the material to a “provider or user of an interactive computer
service.” One would not say, for example, that the author of a magazine
article “provided” it to an interactive computer service provider or user by
allowing the article to be published in hard copy off-line. Although such
an article is available to anyone with access to a library or a newsstand, it
is not ‘provided’ for use on the Internet.
The result in the foregoing example should not change if the interactive
computer service provider or user has a subscription to the magazine. In
that instance, the material in question is “provided” to the “provider or
user of an interactive computer service,” but not in its role as a provider
or user of a computer service.
333 F.3d 1018, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
181. One might also conclude that the underlying logic of the Lanham Act does
not support treating fans’ speech as Quiznos’ speech.
182. See Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/secs_proposed_g.htm (Nov. 5, 2008,
20:58 PST); Posting of Eric Goldman to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/08/sec_proposes_th.htm
(Aug.
28,
2008, 18:10 PST).
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But section 230 does not change every aspect of the law
of blaming one entity for another’s acts.183 A corporation can
only act through individuals.184 If the idea that a corporation
can be held liable for content it provides online is to have
any meaning after section 230, then it must be the case that
some kinds of relationships are sufficient to attribute one
entity’s content to another. At that point, we are arguing
over the contours of agency liability, not over its existence,
and the common law already provides for liability for nonemployee agents in appropriate circumstances.
The Restatement (Third) of Agency recognizes that
agency liability may be contracted or expanded by law.185
Courts have a role in defining agency depending on the
183. Cf. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035-36 (applying principal-agent law to decide a
defamation claim rather than section 230, where defendant was alleged to be
vicariously liable for content posted by another defendant).
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 cmt. b (2006) (“When an
agent is an organization, such as a corporation or other legal entity, it can
perform work only by deploying individuals to take action on its behalf as
subagents.”).
185. See, e.g., id. § 7.06 (2006) (“A principal required by contract or otherwise
by law to protect another cannot avoid liability by delegating performance of the
duty, whether or not the delegate is an agent.”) (emphasis added); id. § 7.08 cmt.
b (discussing statutory bases for liability in the absence of a principal-agent
relationship); id. § 7.01 cmt. c (2006) (recognizing that statutes may change the
common law, including whether an agent is responsible for wrongful conduct
and whether liability is strict); see also, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-318 (1977) (stating that
an agent or bailee who deals with securities in good faith is not liable in
conversion to a third party even though the principal had no right to deal with
the securities, altering the common law rule that an agent has no greater title
than her principal as set forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 349
(1958)); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 455/1, 455/37.11, 455/10, 455/38.5(a) (West
1993 & Supp. 1997) (abrogating the common law of agency for real estate agents
and replacing it with statutory duties on the grounds of public interest in
avoiding misunderstandings); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
326 (1992) (discussing Fair Labor Standards Act’s expansion of “employment”
beyond traditional agency law); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 5, pt. 5, prefatory n.
(2006) (noting that the purpose of a statutory durable power is alteration of the
common law, which terminated an agent’s authority upon the principal’s
incapacity); Charles D. Tobin & Drew Shenkman, Online and Off-Line Publisher
Liability and the Independent Contractor Defense, 26 COMM. LAWYER (ABA),
Mar. 2009, at 1-2 (noting that common law immunity of hiring parties for
independent contractors’ torts has been changed under various circumstances,
including “where a statute or regulation imposes particular responsibility on the
principal, or where the duty is so integral to the principal’s business that it is
presumed to be ‘non-delegable’”).
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circumstances.186 Copyright is an example of an area of law
which has, by common law judicial interpretive techniques,
expanded vicarious liability far beyond its basis in
respondeat superior.187 Sexual harassment law, too, has
adapted agency law to its particular purposes.188 The
contours of secondary liability are malleable depending on
the perceived policy goals of the relevant cause of action.
186. See, e.g., Grace M. Giesel, Client Responsibility for Lawyer Conduct:
Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REV.
346, 348-49, 373-74, 377-78 (2007) (stating that courts routinely deviate from
the common law of agency in assessing lawyer-client relationships, based on a
preference for protecting clients over other policy considerations, and
highlighting deviations from common law on the basis of a policy preference for
protecting clients over all else).
187. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir.
2001) (“Vicarious copyright liability is an ‘outgrowth’ of respondeat superior.”)
(citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir.
1996)); Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nev./TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1325-26
(D. Mass. 1994) (describing vicarious liability as a form of risk allocation). Dixon
v. Atl. Recording Corp., held that it was unnecessary to consider the intricacies
of agency law, instead using a less formal approach:
[A] person who promotes or induces an infringement can be held liable as
a “vicarious infringer,” even through [sic] he has no actual knowledge
that a copyright is being violated, if (1) he has the right and ability to
control or supervise the infringing activity, and (2) he has a direct
financial interest in the exploitation of the copyrighted materials.
No. 85 Civ. 287, 1985 WL 3049, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1985); see also Robyn
Axberg, File-Sharing Tools and Copyright Law: A Study of In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation and MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 389, 399 (2003) (“Vicarious liability emerged as a modification of the
common-law tradition of respondeat superior, but in the realm of copyright
infringement, it extends beyond the employment setting.”) (footnotes omitted).
188. See, e.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (“In light
of the perverse incentives that the Restatement’s ‘scope of employment’ rules
create, we are compelled to modify these principles to avoid undermining the
objectives underlying Title VII.”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
802 n. 3 (1998) (“[O]ur obligation here is not to . . . transplant [Restatement of
Agency provisions] into Title VII. Rather, it is to adapt agency concepts to the
practical objectives of Title VII.”); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (“[C]ommon-law principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII . . . .”); see also David B. Oppenheimer, Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 272, 278-79 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2004) (discussing the evolution of respondeat superior liability for sexual
harassment under Title VII).
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In fact, the Restatement (Third) of Agency allows
vicarious liability for non-employee agents when actions
taken with apparent authority constituted the tort or
enabled the agent to conceal its commission.189 Making a
false or unsubstantiated factual claim, or failing to disclose
the economic relationship between the parties, are the
wrongs targeted by the Endorsement Guidelines, which
would at least seem to be a close analogy to constituting the
tort or enabling its concealment, respectively. Of course, in
cases of nondisclosure, nothing at all is “apparent.” But at
least when there is disclosure of sponsorship, that
disclosure would seem to create apparent authority under
the common law sufficient to allow the substantiation
requirement to apply, since it signals to consumers that the
advertiser is at least partly responsible for the content. And,
though it does not appear that the law regarding
undisclosed principals has addressed similar situations of
nondisclosure, it seems unlikely that advertisers ought to be
allowed to avoid a finding of an agency relationship simply
by not disclosing that there is a relationship.
I readily accept that section 230 bars finding a
respondeat superior or other agency relationship based on
the fact that one party provides Internet access or some
Internet service to the other, even when the second party
gets payment as a condition of or consideration for access.
Such was the basic relationship Congress contemplated
when it decided to immunize access providers for users’
content. But that conclusion doesn’t put any barrier in place
to finding an agency relationship based on other elements of
a relationship.190
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 (2006); see also Dennis A.
Ferraro & Joseph A. Camarra, Hospital Liability: Apparent Agency or Agency by
Estoppel?, 76 ILL. B.J. 364, 366, 368-70 (1988) (explaining that many
jurisdictions hold hospitals liable for torts of independent contractor physicians
based on actual or apparent authority); Giesel, supra note 186, at 357-58 (noting
that both the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) clearly
contemplate agency liability for independent contractors based on actual or
apparent authority).
190. Thus, in accomplishing its mission, the FTC is free to find a relevant
agency relationship in the situation referenced by the Endorsement Guidelines,
where the advertiser’s payment is not linked to provision of access for the
blogger. This would be analogous to finding an agency relationship where the
person qualifies as an employee or independent contractor according to
background principles of agency law. See, e.g., Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v.
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There remains the precedent of Drudge, in which AOL
paid Matt Drudge to provide content and yet still escaped
liability because of section 230.191 Under standard agency
principles, as applied in defamation law, Drudge was not an
agent or employee of AOL. If he had been, the Court’s
discussion implies that section 230 would not have
immunized AOL.192 The true limit, then, comes from the
underlying law of defamation, the constitutional
underpinnings of which shape courts’ determinations of
when parties can be liable for defamatory statements made
by their independent contractors.
One might argue, drawing on other section 230 cases,
that an advertiser cannot be held liable for users’ false
statements unless the advertiser specifically induces the
falsity, rather than inducing the content generally. In a case
involving Craigslist’s alleged inducement of prostitution,
the court held that Craigslist could not be held liable
because its “adult” category was not inherently unlawful as
compared to a site that required users to express unlawful
preferences.193 “Nothing in the service [C]raigslist offers
induces anyone to post any particular listing . . . .”194
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit, ruling on a challenge to
Xcentric Venture, LLC, 199 F. App’x 738, 742-44 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying
section 230 motion to dismiss based on allegation that defendant’s employees
had themselves written defamatory statements about the plaintiff); Cornelius v.
DeLuca, No. CV-10-27-S-BLW, 2010 WL 1709928 (D. Idaho Apr. 26, 2010)
(rejecting a motion to dismiss defamation claims against a website owner based
on allegations that a forum moderator, allegedly acting as a representative of
the website, made defamatory statements).
191. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
192. Id. at 50 & n.9. Compare to Paul Alan Levy’s explanation that:
[In Blumenthal v. Drudge,] AOL was sued only as the publisher of
content on its own interactive computer service, and Blumenthal had
brought a defamation claim under a local law regime that presumably
accepts the limits of respondeat superior-type liability to employers and
employees. Admittedly, though, Blumenthal v. Drudge did not discuss
the lack of liability in those terms.
Levy, supra note 177.
193. Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 09 C 1385, 2009 WL 3416106, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 20, 2009).
194. Id. at *5 (emphasis added) (quoting Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil
Rights v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008)).
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racially, religiously, or otherwise discriminatory ads for
roommates found on the Roommate.com website, found that
the site could not be held liable for the open-ended essay
portion of its form, because users had free rein to post
whatever they liked, including discriminatory content.195 As
long as the advertiser doesn’t require falsity or
nondisclosure, the argument would go, it can’t be liable for
creating a structure that in practice encourages such
behavior, the way that minimally moderated websites
encourage people to express defamatory statements. But
that does not answer the agency point. Courts’ rejections of
inducement theories as ways around section 230 mean only,
and vitally, that being a seductive forum for unlawful
content—an attractive nuisance, as it were—is protected by
section 230. Other types of causation need not be shielded.
In short, even under section 230, if there is an agency
relationship between two parties, that relationship can be
used as the basis of liability.196 Paul Alan Levy nicely makes
the point that the FTC need not apply the common law of
agency any more than its definition of falsity and
misleadingness conforms exactly to the common law of
fraud:
[G]iven the FTC’s broad regulatory authority, the FTC is not
obligated to accept the “scope of employment” limitation of
respondeat superior, and it is not required to accept the limitation
of respondeat superior to the actions of “employees.” Its
advertising guidelines have long held companies responsible for
misleading advertisements published by independent contractors,
and by the same token the FTC is not required to agree that a
company can insulate itself from responsibility for the advertising
195. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the website operator could not
claim section 230 immunity for discriminatory questions, which “don’t magically
become lawful when asked electronically online. The Communications Decency
Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” Id. at
1164; see also id. at 1172 & n.33 (explaining why section 230 is not applicable to
discriminatory questions created by the service provider).
196. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts
must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated
derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a ‘publisher or speaker.’ If it
does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.”); see also Chicago Lawyers, 519 F.3d
at 671 (explaining that Craigslist could not be liable for users’ discriminatory
housing advertisements under §230(c)(1) because it was not the author of the
ads and could not be treated as the “speaker” of posters’ words).
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that it purchases by contracting with one company that in turn
contracts with an individual who publishes the misleading
content.197

A recent administrative adjudication suggests that the
pay-for-posting situation poses a genuinely new challenge to
the question of advertiser liability, one that the FTC might
reasonably resolve either way. In re Gemtronics, Inc.198
began with the proposition that “liability [for false
advertising] does not require proof that the respondent
physically distributed advertisements . . . . Moreover, a
respondent need not be the sole cause of dissemination of
false advertisements, but can be held liable for participating
with others in the creation and/or dissemination of false
advertisements.”199 The law holds advertisers liable when
they cause the dissemination of false advertising, regardless
of their intentions.200 However, the party to be held liable
must have participated in the creation or dissemination of
the ads.201 Thus, a manufacturer has been held liable for ads
it provided to distributors, but not for ads prepared by its
distributors.202
Applying these principles, the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) found that a respondent was not liable for
false ads on a website that had directed business to him
when there was no agreement with the actual source of the
website to direct business to him.203 In fact, his name was
used on the website without his permission and purchases
made through the website went to other parties, not to him
(though he did fulfill some small orders placed through the
website as an unpaid courtesy to the website operator, with
197. Levy, supra note 177.
198. No. 9330, F.T.C. (Sept. 16, 2009) (initial decision), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9330/091002gemtronicsinitialdec.pdf.
199. Id. at 5.
200. See id. at 51 (“[T]he phrase ‘cause to be disseminated’ in Section 12 of the
FTC Act ‘is in the statute without qualification related to the advertiser’s state
of mind’ and that ‘the statute holds him liable for the natural consequences of
his act regardless of his intentions.’”) (quoting Mueller v. United States, 262
F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir. 1958)).
201. Id. at 6.
202. See id. (citing In re Dobbs Truss Co., 48 F.T.C. 1090 (1952), 1952 FTC
LEXIS 49, at *50-51).
203. Id. at 55.
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whom he had a business relationship).204 The ALJ pointed
out that past cases involved active participation in creation
or dissemination of advertisements.205
The key question is: what counts as active
participation? In the case of user endorsements, does paying
for the creation of the ad without exercising any creative
control suffice? A manufacturer would be liable for a false
ad produced by an ad agency to which it had delegated
complete creative control, and it would be possible to extend
the same reasoning to others paid to produce ads. In at least
one prior case, the FTC has relied in part on the fact that a
manufacturer did not pay any advertising allowance or
other financial aid to its distributors to find that the
manufacturer was not responsible for the distributors’ false
advertising.206 Change that fact, and the result could readily
change.
Even in the absence of section 230 protection, there are
likely to be constitutional constraints on the types of
relationships that can sustain liability, depending on the
underlying cause of action. Defamation liability for
intermediaries such as newspapers, for example, has been
sharply limited in order to avoid chilling speech, even when
the newspapers are paid to run allegedly defamatory ads.207
Agency law has recognized these First Amendment
constraints in its treatment of defamation.208 Some baseline
204. Id.
205. See id. at 53 (“An advertising agency may be held liable for deceptive
advertising if the agency (1) was an active participant in the preparation of the
advertisement, and (2) knew or had reason to know that the advertisement was
deceptive.”) (citations omitted).
206. See In re Dobbs Truss Co., 1952 FTC LEXIS at *49.
207. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Rebecca
Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1005-09 (2008).
208. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. d (2006). A reporter’s
note in the Restatement explained that because the credibility of a defamatory
statement is affected by the credibility of the person who appears to endorse it,
defamation liability can be tied to apparent authority. Despite this, “[m]any
cases interpret Sullivan to incorporate an implicit requirement that the plaintiff
establish actual malice independently against each defendant,” except that
malice is imputed from employee to employer. Id. § 7.08 reporter’s n.d (citing
McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The
MacFarlane court interpreted Sullivan as refusing “to impute to the individuals
as principals any information in the minds of persons they authorized to act as
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due process principle might also prevent certain kinds of
agency attributions, such as holding advertisers liable for
unsolicited, uncompensated statements made by simple
fans of the product or service.209 This is as yet a purely
theoretical concern, because the FTC has not proposed to
regulate nonsponsored posts even if they are made on
advertiser-run discussion boards or forums. In such cases, a
section 230 argument would also retain compelling force.210
CONCLUSION
Advertising is protean where law is not. But advertising
is not special that way; the problem of adapting to new
variants of behavior, some shaped precisely to avoid
regulation, is a typical one and need not defeat the law.
A theory of why people and entities choose to speak in
particular ways helps us navigate the boundaries of
commercial speech. The current debate over undisclosed
endorsement deals reveals lacunae in our understanding
and accommodation of how speech really works. For
example, the way in which regulation of pay-for-posting
schemes requires us to acknowledge that what is
conventionally called puffery actually does influence
consumers. Material puffery is an aspect of the infinite
malleability of attention-getting strategies—nonfalsifiable
claims may well persuade consumers—and highlights the
their agents in the matter.” 74 F.3d at 1302. See also Cantrell v. Forest City
Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253–54 & n.6 (1974) (approving unchallenged jury
instruction allowing plaintiff to use actual malice of employee to prove
employer’s actual malice); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
1350, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“Indeed, the requirement that the defendant’s state
of mind be proven is the cornerstone of the constitutional requisite that a
plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with
knowledge of or a reckless disregard of the truth.”), aff’d, 85 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1996); Tobin & Shenkman, supra note 185.
209. Note, however, that product liability law is sometimes prepared to hold
manufacturers liable for third-party uses that were sufficiently foreseeable. The
intuition that there are limits on responsibility for other people’s statements
made about products and services once they enter the stream of commerce
draws on free speech principles, not just general due process considerations. I
thank Mark Tushnet for discussion on this point.
210. Of course consumers might well expect fans to congregate on the sites run
by their favored brands, so such sites do not pose much of an “astroturf” problem
in the first place.
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distance between consumer decisionmaking and abstract
concepts of truth and falsity.211 Given the effectiveness of
endorsements, even those light on facts, disclosure is
justified to allow consumers to apply their own preferred
discount to advertiser-sponsored speech.
As with many speech controversies, new forms of
advertising raise institutional competence questions. In this
case, courts could allow the FTC to use agency law to finetune section 230 to deal with endorsements. The alternative
would be to read section 230 aggressively, even perhaps to
the point of eliminating liability based on agency or on
nonemployee agency. This would force Congress to act if it
concludes that the law sweeps too broadly. I have argued
that nothing in free speech theory or doctrine counsels in
favor of such a radical reading. Given that section 230 is a
prophylactic, speech-protective measure designed to avoid
over-policing of speech by service providers, it could be read
to bar the FTC’s guidelines, but it need not be to fulfill its
purposes.
The uncertainty over section 230’s scope is
unsurprising. Congress did not anticipate how online speech
would develop. The fear behind section 230 is that holding
an intermediary liable seems compelling in individual cases
but is cumulatively harmful to a valued endeavor, the cheap
and open Internet. Given more experience with the law and
with marketing practices developing online, we could
consider making finer distinctions between types of content
and providers’ relationship to that content, as we do with
respect to intellectual property.212 Or we could conclude that
ISP liability, like attention, should generally be managed in
211. Cf. Amy J. Tindell, “Indecent” Deception: The Role of Communications
Decency Act § 230 in Balancing Consumer and Marketer Interests Online, 2009
B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. FORUM 071901 at *29-30 (2009) (“The Internet has
spawned novel marketing strategies for businesses, including the guerilla tactic
of ads popping onto the screen of unsuspecting Internet users, paying search
engines for placement near the top of search results, and using competitor
names as metatags. Laws made today to combat these problems may prove
ineffective tomorrow as marketers use technology to work around existing legal
structures to change consumer behavior.”).
212. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (enumerating the detailed “safe harbor”
provisions for online service providers); Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, 576 F. Supp. 2d
463, 468-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Tindell, supra note 211, at *28-29 (arguing
that Congress should act specifically to deal with the relationship between
advertising and section 230).
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gross, without subtle distinctions that are difficult to
navigate in practice. The only sure thing is that advertisers
will invent new claims and methods of delivery that will
require new responses.

